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New Developments in Contribution
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Illinois, the right of contribution among co-tortfeasors is governed by the Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act ("Contribution Act").' Under the Contribution Act, a co-tortfeasor who
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 301-305 (1989). The Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors Act provides:
301. Application of Act
§ 1. This Act applies to causes of action arising on or after March 1, 1978.
302. Right of contribution
§ 2. Right of Contribution.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, where 2 or more persons are
subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or property, or
the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them, even
though judgment has not been entered against any or all of them.
(b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid
more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is
limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor
is liable to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the common
liability.
(c) When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given
in good faith to one or more persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury
or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors
from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide but it
reduces the recovery on any claim against the others to the extent of any
amount stated in the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration actually paid for it, whichever is greater.
(d) The tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is
discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor.
(e) A tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is not
entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability is not
extinguished by the settlement.
(f) Anyone who, by payment, has discharged in full or in part the liability of
a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full his obligation to the tortfeasor, is
subrogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution. This provision does not
affect any right of contribution nor any right of subrogation arising from any
other relationship.
303. Amount of contribution
§ 3. Amount of Contribution. The pro rata share of each tortfeasor shall be
determined in accordance with his relative culpability. However, no person
shall be required to contribute to one seeking contribution an amount greater
than his pro rata share unless the obligation of one or more of the joint
tortfeasors is uncollectible. In that event, the remaining tortfeasors shall share
the unpaid portions of the uncollectible obligation in accordance with their pro
rata liability.
If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a
single share.
304. Rights of plaintiff unaffected
§ 4. Rights of Plaintiff Unaffected. A plaintiff's right to recover the full
amount of his judgment from any one or more defendants subject to liability in
tort for the same injury to person or property, or for wrongful death, is not
affected by the provisions of this Act.
305. Enforcement
§ 5. Enforcement. A cause of action for contribution among joint tortfeasors
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has paid (either by settlement or judgment) more than his pro rata
share of the common injury may seek pro rata contribution from
those co-tortfeasors whose liability in tort has been extinguished.2
Thus, the tortfeasor who extinguishes another co-tortfeasor's liability is entitled to contribution-a proportional sharing of their responsibility for the common injury. The Contribution Act also
provides, however, that a tortfeasor who settles in good faith with
the injured party is discharged from his obligation to contribute
even if the settling party pays less than his pro rata share.3 Consequently, a tortfeasor who in good faith discharges its own liability
is protected from a subsequent contribution claim by another cotortfeasor.
This Article is presented in four parts and surveys the recent
developments in this important area of law. Part II considers the
essential elements of the right of contribution and the effect that an
immunity may have on a tortfeasor's liability for contribution.
Part III examines various procedural issues related to the filing of
contribution actions. Part IV discusses the pre-Contribution Act
theories of implied indemnity and equitable apportionment and
considers whether they remain viable theories of recovery in light
of the Act. Finally, Part V addresses the nature and effect of a
good faith settlement and the procedural aspects of the hearing to
determine whether a settlement was achieved in good faith.
II.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION

As a threshold matter, several essential elements must be established for a party to be entitled to contribution. First, the cotortfeasors must be "liable in tort."4 Second, the law must recognize "a right of contribution among" the co-tortfeasors. 5 Third,
the party seeking contribution must prove that he has extinguished
the co-tortfeasor's liability for the common injury.6 Finally, the
party seeking contribution must have paid more than his pro rata
share.7
may be asserted by a separate action before or after payment, by counterclaim
or by third-party complaint in a pending action.
Id.
2.
3.
4.

Id. para. 302(b).
Id. para. 302(c)-(d).
Id. para. 302(a).

5. Id.
6.
7.

Id. para. 302(b), (e).
Id. para. 302(b).
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A.

Persons Subject to "Liability in Tort"
1. General Tort Liability

The Contribution Act provides that the right of contribution exists when co-tortfeasors are "liable in tort."' The Illinois courts
have given this requirement an expansive reading, emphasizing
that liability in tort is the only prerequisite for recovering contribution under the Act.9 Nevertheless, various issues arise in interpreting the phrase, "liable in tort," including: (1) whether an employer
entitled to immunity in the underlying action by virtue of the
Worker's Compensation Act I° is liable in tort; (2) whether all
tortfeasors must be liable on the same theory of liability; (3)
whether all tortfeasors must be jointly and severally liable for all of
the injured party's damages; (4) whether the breach of a statutorily
imposed duty constitutes liability in tort; and (5) whether a
tortfeasor is liable for contribution after he has successfully defended against the injured party's claim in the underlying suit on
primary liability.
As a general proposition, the question of whether the parties are
"liable in tort" depends on the relationship between the injured
party and the would-be tortfeasors at the time the injured party's
cause of action arises."1 The theory of liability advanced in the
injured party's complaint is not dispositive of the question of
whether the third-party defendant could have been liable in tort to
the injured party. Instead, the court independently may discern
whether the third-party defendant could have been held liable on a
2
duty imposed under law.'

In addition, tortfeasors need not be found liable on the same
theory of liability, as long as all are liable in tort.13 Thus, for example, a defendant found liable under a theory of product liability can
8. Id. para. 302(a).
9. See, e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. McCartin-McAuliffe, 516 N.E.2d 260, 267 (Ill. 1987)
("[T]here is no requirement that the basis for liability among the contributors be the same
• . . [and] there is no requirement that the basis for contribution mirror the theory of
recovery asserted in the original action." (citations omitted)).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 138-138.30 (1989).
11. Doyle v. Rhodes, 461 N.E.2d 382, 386 (Il. 1984) (" '[L]iability' is determined at
the time of the injury out of which the right to contribution arises, and not at the time the
action for contribution is brought." (quoting Stephens v. McBride, 455 N.E.2d 54, 57 (Ill.
1983))).
12. Joe & Dan Int'l Corp. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Corp., 533 N.E.2d 912, 918 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988); see Giordano v. Morgan, 554 N.E.2d 810, 814 (Il1.App. Ct. 2d
Dist. 1990).
13. J.I. Case, 516 N.E.2d at 267.
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pursue a contribution claim premised on negligence. 4
Similarly, a defendant sued on theories of both tort and contract
law may nonetheless seek contribution for tort liability. In
Leaman v. Anderson, 5 the court held that a settling defendant sued
on theories of both tort and contract law may execute a good faith
settlement and seek contribution from another, providing that it is
not seeking "to pass on liability for an arguably uncontributable
(contract) claim."' 6
Importantly, tortfeasors need not be jointly and severally liable
for all of the plaintiff's injuries. The operative provision of the
Contribution Act states that "[w]here 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or
property" a right to contribution exists between them. 7 In May8
hew Steel Products, Inc. v. Hirschfelder,1
the court held that the
Contribution Act applies to successive tortfeasors who are liable
only to the extent that they aggravate the plaintiff's injuries. Thus,
in Mayhew, the original tortfeasor was permitted to recover against
a second tortfeasor who caused successive damage to the injured
party.' 9 Although the second tortfeasor was not jointly and severally liable for all of the plaintiff's injuries, both tortfeasors were
liable to the plaintiff for the injury caused by the second
tortfeasor.2 °
Further, a party may be liable in tort to the injured party even
though its initial relationship with that individual was founded in
contract. In Cirilo's,Inc. v. Gleeson, Sklar & Sawyers,2' the court
held that a person is liable in tort to one with whom that person
contracted if the basis of liability is the breach of a statutory duty.
The Cirilo decision, however, was seriously questioned in People ex
reL Hartigan v. Community Hospital of Evanston.22 The court in
Community Hospital of Evanston questioned whether the mere violation of a statutorily imposed duty constitutes liability in tort for
purposes of the Contribution Act. 23 Relying upon Kinzer v. City of
Chicago,24 the Community Hospital of Evanston court held that
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
23.
24.

Id.
526 N.E.2d 639 (I11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1988).
Id. at 641.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(a) (198'") (emphasis added).
501 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1986).
Id.
Id.
507 N.E.2d 81, 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987).
S.E.
_2... (Mi. App. Ct. ist Dist. 1989).
Id. at 231.
539 N.E.2d 1216 (Ill. 1989).
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breach of a fiduciary duty does not constitute liability in tort under
the Contribution Act.25
2 6 the court held that a defendant
Finally, in McCombs v. Dexter,
who receives a favorable judgment against the plaintiff in the underlying primary litigation is not subject to liability and, consequently, not subject to a claim for contribution. The court's
rationale was that a defendant who has been found to have no liability to the plaintiff cannot come within the Contribution Act's
provision requiring the defendant to be subject to liability in tort.2 7
The McCombs court rejected the argument that the third-party defendant could be "liable in tort" to the injured party on grounds
not raised by the losing plaintiff, and held that a favorable judgment against the injured party insulates a co-tortfeasor from contribution. 2

Thus, McCombs illustrates that an injured party's

incompetence in pleading can potentially defeat a tortfeasor's right
to contribution.
2. Statutory Liability
In Illinois, statutory liability for contribution has arisen most
notably, with respect to the dramshop and environmental protection statutes. Interestingly, the courts' conclusions regarding liability in these two areas have not been consistent.
a. Dramshop Liability
A recurring issue is whether a tortfeasor has the right to seek
contribution from a dramshop. Despite countervailing arguments,
courts consistently have denied the right of contribution against a
dramshop.29
25. Community Hosp. of Evanston, 545 N.E.2d at 230. In assessing the Community
Hosp. of Evanston decision, one should note that an alternative ground existed to support
the result. From what appears in the opinion, the third-party plaintiff was released by
virtue of a non-monetary settlement with the injured party. Id. at 231. Thus, having
incurred no monetary liability, the third-party plaintiff could not demonstrate that he
paid more than his pro rata share in order to be discharged. Id.
26. 542 N.E.2d 1245, 1247 (I11.App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1989).
27. Id. at 1246. In McCombs, the defendant/third-party plaintiff asserted several theories of liability not raised by the original plaintiff. Id. at 1245. The third-party plaintiff
alleged that "[the defendant c]onstructed, owned, and maintained a building with structural defects which resulted in plaintiff's injuries; and [flailed to provide the building with
guardrails for the protection of tenants and foreseeable invitees contrary to the requirements of the code and the law." Id. at 1246. Thus, arguably the defendant received a
favorable judgment only because the original plaintiff failed to raise the more viable
claims asserted in the third-party plaintiff's contribution action.
28. Id. at 1247.
29. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Powers, 497 N.E.2d 757, 759 (Ill. 1986); Matusak v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 520 N.E.2d 925, 929 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988).
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A dramshop's liability for injuries is sui generis and not properly
characterized as liability in tort for purposes of the Contribution
Act.3 ° In Jodelis v. Harris,3 the supreme court rejected the notion
32
that the law imposing liability on dramshops is tortious in nature.
The court drew particular support from the fact that dramshops
had no common law liability for injuries caused by or to their patrons.3 3 Furthermore, the court reasoned that liability in contribution would contravene the intent of the Dramshop Act, 34 which is
to define and limit the extent of a dramshop's liability. 35 Accordingly, the law that dramshops will not incur contribution liability
36
seems well settled.
b.

Environmental Protection Act Liability

In People v. Fioriniand People v. Brockman, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that a landowner, subject to liability in a suit by the
State for violations of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act,37
could bring a contribution claim against his customers-waste
haulers and waste generators-whose waste contributed to the
statutory violation. 38 In so holding, the court recognized that statutory liability under certain circumstances may be "liability in
tort" for purposes of application of the Contribution Act. 39 The
court reasoned that because the State's complaint alleged both stat30. Hopkins, 497 N.E.2d at 759.
31. 517 N.E.2d 1055 (Ill. 1987). In Jodelis, the plaintiff was intoxicated when he was
injured by the defendant/third-party plaintiff. Id. at 1056. The third-party plaintiff
sought contribution from the dramshop the plaintiff had patronized. Id.
32. Id. at 1057.
33. Id. at 1058.
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, para. 135 (1989).
35. Jodelis, 517 N.E.2d at 1058.
36. The Jodelis opinion is consistent with the supreme court's prior decision in Hopkins v. Powers, 497 N.E.2d 757, 759 (Ill. 1986) (holding that dramshop liability arises
under the Dramshop Act rather than in tort). In Hopkins, the plaintiff, after drinking in
a tavern operated by the defendant, drove away in a vehicle owned by another. Id. at
758. The plaintiff subsequently had an accident, resulting in personal injury and property
damage. Id. Unlike Hopkins, however, the defendant/third-party plaintiff in Jodelis was
not the intoxicated individual who tried to circumvent the Dramshop Act by securing
benefits denied him under that Act. Jodelis, 517 N.E.2d at 1056. Rather, Jodelis involved one who complained that the dramshop should share responsibility for the intoxicated party's injuries. Id.
In a related matter, the court in Matusak v. Chicago Transit Auth., 520 N.E.2d 925,
928-29 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988), held that the Dramshop Act does not provide an
independent basis for contribution against the dramshop operator.
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1021 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
38. People v. Fiorini, 574 N.E.2d 612, 621 (Ill. 1991); People v. Brockman, 574
N.E.2d 626. 636 (Ti!_ !9!).
Fi ri:i .,- ,nun
were companion cases decided on
May 30, 1991.
39. Brockman, 574 N.E.2d at 634.
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utory and common law claims, the question before it was whether
either basis constituted tortious conduct. 4° The court determined
that " 'a tort has been defined as a breach of a noncontractual legal
duty owed to the plaintiff, the source of which may be a statute as
well as the common law.' "41 The court also recognized "that
while a court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for
damages, one important form of remedy for tort may also be an
injunction or restitution.

' 42

The court further observed that "[t]he

only requirement is that the availability of these remedies will depend in the first instance upon the
possibility that an action for
43
damages could lie for the wrong.

In People v. Brockman, the court found that the third-party defendants had a duty not to contaminate the environment and that
the State suffered an injury from breach of that duty. 44 The court
held that it was irrelevant that the State sought injunctive relief
rather than damages, because a violation of the Illinois Environ-

46
mental Protection Act 4 creates the potential for liability in tort.

Therefore, the court concluded that such a violation could satisfy
the "subject to liability" element of the Contribution Act and thus
serve as a proper basis for a contribution claim.47
At first glance, this holding seems irreconcilable with the
supreme court dramshop decisions in Jodelis v. Harris and Hopkins
v. Powers,4 both of which held that dramshop liability, because it
is based on a statute, is not "liability in tort" within the meaning of
the coverage provision of the Contribution Act.49 These two sets
of holdings-the dramshop decisions of Jodelis and Hopkins on the
one hand and the environmental cases of Fioriniand Brockman on
the other-seem exactly opposite to the ordinary-language interpretations of their respective statutes, i.e., that statutory dramshop
liability for damages to a person physically injured by a drunken
patron is liability in tort, and that liability for statutory penalties,
injunctive relief, and clean up costs in an action brought by the
40.

Id.

41. Id. (quoting Hopkins v. Powers, 497 N.E.2d 757, 760 (111. 1986) (Goldenhersh, J.,
dissenting)).
42.

Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

TORTS § 1, at 2-3 (5th ed. 1984)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1021 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
46. Brockman, 574 N.E.2d at 634.
47. Id.
48. Jodelis v Harris, 517 N.E.2d 1055 (Ill.
1987); Hopkins v. Powers, 497 N.E.2d 757
(Il1. 1986).
49. See Jodelis, 517 N.E.2d at 1058; Hopkins, 497 N.E.2d at 759; supra note 36.
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State is not liability in tort. Moreover, the cases seem flatly inconsistent with each other, although Fiorini and Brockman were
clearly not intended to overrule Jodelis and Hopkins.
The cases are reconcilable, however, by looking to the implied or
inferred intent of the legislature on the contribution question in the
statute that imposes liability. In Jodelis and Hopkins, the court
likely assumed that the legislature, when enacting the Dramshop
Act, did not intend to allow the drunk driver or a third-party defendant to pass off any of his liability on the dramshop. On the
other hand, in Fiorini,the court had an explicit legislative action, a
recent amendment to the Illinois environmental act, 50 which indicated an intent to allow contribution in such cases. 1 Although the
Fiorinicourt held that this amendment could not be applied retroactively, the court's interpretation of the Contribution Act, reaching roughly the same result, may have been influenced by the
52
amendment's clearly-expressed legislative intent.
Thus, in dealing with statutory liability cases in the future, Illinois judges should, consistent with the above decisions, first explore whether there is any implied or inferred legislative intent in
the specific statute to allow or preclude a contribution claim. If
none exists, the court then may safely examine ordinary criteriacommon usage and the understanding of the profession-to determine what is statutory "liability in tort."
3.

The Effect of Immunities

A recurring issue in the interpretation of the phrase "liable in
tort" is the effect of an immunity that a tortfeasor may invoke
against the injured party upon that tortfeasor's liability for contribution. In some instances, courts have held that the immunity
bars the right of contribution.
a.

Immunities that Bar Contribution Claims

Both the sovereign immunity doctrine and the public official's
immunity doctrine have been invoked to bar contribution claims.
For example, in Martin v. Lion Uniform Co.," the court denied
contribution against a municipality, holding that a municipality is
50. 1990 ILL. LAWS 2786-90 (amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1045(b)
(1989 & Supp. 1990)).
51. People v. Fiorini, 574 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ill. 1991).
52. Id. at 618.
53. 535 N.C.2d 736, 73;-46 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989). In Martin, two firemen
sued a builder for injuries suffered while fighting a fire at its building. Id. at 736. The
builder sought contribution from the firemen's employer, the City of Chicago. Id. at 737.
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not subject to liability under the terms of the Act.54 The court
55 and found that the Act was
likened the result to Jodelis v. Harris
not intended to cover a city's negligence in fire protection.5 6 Similarly, the court in Stephens v. Cozadd57 held that the public officials' immunity doctrine bars a contribution claim against a
flagman working for the State.
b. Immunities that Do Not Bar Contribution Claims
A parent's common law immunity from liability to his or her
child does not bar an action for contribution when the parent's
conduct is a concurrent cause of the child's injury."8 Similarly, a
spouse's statutory immunity does not bar a contribution action
filed by a tortfeasor against the culpable spouse. 59
c. An Employer's Immunity Does Not Bar Contribution Claims
But Limits the Extent of Contribution Liability
Although an employer is protected from suits by its employees
for common law damages actions due to statutory worker's compensation immunity, a defendant manufacturer in a products liabil6
ity claim may seek contribution from the plaintiff's employer. 0
The supreme court reaffirmed this rule under the Contribution Act
in 1984 in Doyle v. Rhodes,6 1 by holding that the employer was
"subject to liability in tort" within the meaning of the Contribution
Act's coverage provision because the employer's statutory immunity had to be specifically raised in a common law damage action
and that, until it was asserted, the employer was subject to liability
The court held that a municipality that is not subject to a statutory or common law duty
to its firefighters is not liable in tort to a firefighter injured while fighting a fire. Id.
54. Id. at 743.
55. 517 N.E.2d 1055, 1058 (Ill. 1987).
56. Martin, 536 N.E.2d at 739; see also McShane v. Chicago Inv. Corp., 546 N.E.2d
660 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989) (holding that the City could not be reached in contribution for alleged negligent training of its firemen, since direct action would be barred by
the Tort Immunity Act).
57. 512 N.E.2d 812 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1987); see also Kinzer v. City of Chicago,
539 N.E.2d 1216, 1220 (Ill. 1989) (holding that a municipal employee's breach of fiduciary duty does not constitute liability in tort); Lietsch v. Allen, 527 N.E.2d 978, 981 (111.
App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1988) (holding that the Tort Immunity Act bars contribution against
public employees in the exercise of their judgment and discretion).
58. Hartigan v. Beery, 470 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1984); Larson v.
Buschkamp, 435 N.E.2d 221, 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1982).
59. Wirth v. City of Highland Park, 430 N.E.2d 236, 242 (111. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
1981).
60. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 374 N.E.2d 437, 443 (Ill.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
61. 461 N.E.2d 382 (Ill. 1984).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 23

in tort. 62

Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Kotecki v. Cyclops
Welding Corp.,63 wrote that it was not overruling Skinner v. ReedPrentice Division Package Machinery Co."4 and Doyle, 65 both of
which held that employers are liable for contribution regardless of
the worker's compensation immunity provision." The Kotecki
court simply resolved a question that both prior cases left undecided-the extent of the employer's contribution liability.67 On
that question, the Kotecki court held that an employer's contribution liability cannot exceed the employer's statutory liability under
the Worker's Compensation Act. 68 The court reasoned that this
limitation on the employer's contribution liability reconciles the
policy of the Contribution Act-to allocate liability proportionate
to fault-with the competing policy of the Worker's Compensation
Act-to provide assured compensation for all work-related injuries
in return for limited liability on the part of the employer.69
The Kotecki holding raises many practical but unresolved questions. First, how does the Kotecki limitation work? What does the
court mean when it says that the employer's contribution liability
cannot exceed its statutory worker's compensation liability? It
seems to mean that the employer may be required to pay, in addition to its worker's compensation payment to the employee, an additional amount equal to its worker's compensation liability, as
contribution to the contribution plaintiff. Compared to a simple
overruling of Doyle and Skinner, which would provide that no contribution would be payable by the employer, the employer under
Kotecki probably is responsible for an additional amount equal to
its worker's compensation liability.
As an alternative interpretation, the Kotecki opinion may mean
that the worker's compensation payments already paid to the employee count as the employer's contribution share. That interpretation, however, if combined with continued recognition of the
compensation lien, would reduce the employee's total compensation below full recovery-a result that the court could not have
intended. Under either of these interpretations, however, the
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
at 443.

~.

68.
69.

Id. at 387.
585 N.E.2d 1023 (Ill. 1991).
Skinner, 374 N.E.2d at 437.
Doyle, 461 N.E.2d at 382.
Kotecki, 585 N.E.2d at 1025-26; Doyle, 461 N.E.2d at 388; Skinner, 374 N.E.2d
.

.t

ui N.E.2

Id. at 1027-28.
Id. at 1028.

at i02j.
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Kotecki limitation is neither an interpretation of the Contribution
Act nor an interpretation of the worker's compensation immunity
provision, but rather is a judicially-adopted rule specifically
designed to reconcile the policies behind the two statutes. Such a
judicially-crafted rule means that questions raised by Kotecki, like
those raised by Laue v. Leifheit,' 0 are not answerable by means of
statutory interpretation.
Will courts apply Kotecki retroactively? The opinion assumes
the court is not overruling anything. Since, in the court's view,
Kotecki is not a change in the law, the court may decide to apply
the rule retroactively to pending cases. There is a fair argument
that retroactive application can be refused to decisions of open
questions not clearly foreshadowed by past decisions. That argument might not succeed here, however, because it tends to undermine the court's position that it simply resolved an open question it
promised in Doyle v. Rhodes to resolve later.
How should the Kotecki limitation be imposed? The obvious approach is to ask juries to come back with percentages of fault for
the contribution plaintiff and the employer-contribution defendant,
to be translated into dollar amounts by the court, which would also
impose the limitation. For example, if the jury finds the employer
responsible for 50% of the total fault, the primary defendant responsible for 50% of the total fault, total damages of $1,000,000
and compensation liability of $100,000, the court could enter a dollar amount of $100,000 for the employer's contribution share, reallocating $400,000 back to the primary defendant's share, for a total
of $900,000 to the primary defendant.
One possible problem with this approach, however, is that it
risks reducing the primary defendant's fault below 25%, thus triggering application of the several liability statute,7 ' which precludes
the court from shifting back to the primary defendant the amount
allocated by the jury's percentages to the employer over the
worker's compensation liability. This problem might be resolved
by saying that the initial jury percentages were not the final percentages, but rather that they were simply steps toward their calculation. Therefore, the ultimate allocation by the court would be
the one to which the several liability statute applies. This would
require that the court translate the dollar amount of the employer's
70. 473 N.E.2d 939, 941 (Ill. 1984) (holding that a defendant's separate action for
contribution was barred because the defendant failed to bring the action in the original
suit).
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1117 (1989).
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liability, determined under the Kotecki cap, back into a percentage
of the total liability.
Another unresolved issue raised by Kotecki is whether the employer's liability cap is defined by the accrued worker's compensation liability at the time of trial or the accrued plus projected future
worker's compensation liability? This question seems to involve
the problem of meshing two different systems of compensationthe "one shot" tort system with the continuing compensation system under worker's compensation. One easily could formulate arguments supporting either side. But at bottom, it is not a question
of meshing two systems, but rather of the exact location of a partially arbitrary line the supreme court has drawn between two conflicting statutory policies. Unfortunately, the resolution of that
question simply depends on the fiat of the Illinois Supreme Court,
and it will not be resolved until the supreme court determines what
is meant by its limitation to "worker's compensation liability."
"A Right of ContributionAmong Them"
Courts have denied the right of contribution to some tortfeasors
even though these parties have discharged the liability of all other
co-tortfeasors. The issues arising in this section concern whether a
tortfeasor, guilty of intentional or wilful misconduct, is entitled to
contribution, and whether co-tortfeasors who have a pre-existing
contractual agreement providing for insurance to cover their tort
liability, are barred from contribution.
B.

1.

Intentional Tortfeasors

No right of contribution exists on behalf of an intentional
tortfeasor. 72 Thus, despite the fact that a party has discharged another co-tortfeasor's liability, the supreme court, in Gerill Corp. v.
Jack L. Hargrove Builders, Inc. ,"a held that an intentional wrongdoer is not entitled to contribution.74 Although the Contribution
Act is silent on the issue, the Gerill court concluded that the legislature did not intend the Act to protect the interests of intentional
tortfeasors. 7 ' The Gerill opinion leaves open the question, however, of whether a tortfeasor found guilty of wilful and wanton
misconduct might similarly be barred from contribution. This
72. Gerill Corp. v. Jack L. Hargrove Builders, Inc., 538 N.E.2d 530, 542 (Ill.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 894 (1989).
73. Id. (specifically overruling Dovin v. Winfield Township: '17 Nd.E.2d 111 (iii.
AD.

74.
75.

o.
Ct. 2d M!'_ 109?7)'

Id.
Id.

--
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point is noteworthy because the Gerill decision specifically refers
without adverse comment to Pipes v. American Logging Tool
Corp.,76 a case in which the court held that wilful and wanton
tortfeasors were entitled to contribution. 7

In Carl Sandburg Village Condominium Ass'n, No. 1 v. First
Condominium Development Co. ,78 the court considered the procedural ramifications of a defendant/third-party plaintiff sued in the
underlying primary litigation on grounds that would permit recovery on either a finding of intentional or negligent wrongdoing. The
court concluded that the defendant/third-party plaintiff's right to
contribution depended upon a determination of that party's culpability. 79 The court held that third-party plaintiffs will not have a
right to contribution if they are found liable for their intentional
acts. 0 Thus, the right of contribution in this instance must await a
determination of culpability by the trier of fact.
The question of who is an intentional tortfeasor for purposes of
applying the Gerill rule may not always have an obvious, simple
answer, as the previously discussed cases of People v. Brockman 81
and People v. Fiorini2 illustrate. In Brockman, the court allowed
contribution claims by a landfill operator accused of violating sections 21(d) and (e) of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act,"
since he caused or allowed special waste to be accepted and disposed of on the site in violation of the requirements of the Act and
the solid waste rules adopted by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to the Act. 4 The supreme court reasoned
that Gerill did not preclude the alleged violator's contribution
claim against generators and haulers of the offending solid waste
because the alleged violator was not found guilty of intentional
conduct nor was such a finding required as an element of the cause
of action. 5
76. 487 N.E.2d 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1985). But see Bresland v. Ideal Roller &
Graphics Co., 501 N.E.2d 830, 839 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986) (finding that wilful and
wanton misconduct bars right of contribution); see also Hall v. Archer-Daniels-Midland
Co., 524 N.E.2d 586, 592 (Ill. 1988) (holding that a settling tortfeasor is not entitled to
contribution for funds properly allocable to the injured party's punitive damage claim).
77. Gerill, 538 N.E.2d at 540.
78. 557 N.E.2d 246 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990).
79. Id. at 250.
80. Id.
81. 574 N.E.2d 626 (Ill. 1991); see supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
82. 574 N.E.2d 612 (Ill. 1991).
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 1021(d), (e) (1989 & Supp. 1990).
84. Brockman, 574 N.E.2d at 633.
85. Id. at 635; see also Fiorini, 574 N.E.2d at 623 ("intent is not an element to be
proven for a violation under the Act").
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Agreements Precluding Contribution: Insurance Policies
Procured on Behalf of Co-Tortfeasors

A court will interpret agreements, which provide insurance as
part of the parties' bargain, as "providing mutual exculpation." 86
The rationale is that "[t]he parties are deemed to have agreed to
look solely to the insurance in the event of loss and not impose
liability on the part of the other party."8 " In Briseno v. Chicago
Union Station Co. ,88 the co-tortfeasors entered into an agreement in
which one of the parties procured insurance to protect both parties
from tort liability. A tort action arose and the insurance company
settled the suit on behalf of one of the insureds.89 Subsequently,
and ostensibly on behalf of the settling tortfeasor, the insurance
company brought a contribution action against the co-insured, cotortfeasor who, parenthetically, paid for the insurance policy.'
Treating the contribution action as one initiated and controlled by
the insurance company, the court ruled that there was no right to
contribution because the parties' insurance company fully satisfied
their tort liability. 91 The court held that a contribution action in
this context was an unconscionable attempt by the insurance company to avoid its contractual liability and a clear instance of the
insurance company placing its interest ahead of its insured's
interest.92
In Monical v. State Farm Insurance Co. ,93 the court followed the
lead of Briseno. The Monical court, however, interpreted Briseno
as holding that the parties' intent regarding the specific agreement
to provide insurance was to extinguish any liability between themselves. 94 According to the Monical court, Briseno did not recognize a general rule of law that any agreement providing insurance
as part of the bargain bars one bargaining party from thereafter
imposing liability on another for losses envisioned in the agreement
to insure. 95 Thus, the Monical court would consider a range of
specific facts relating to both the transaction and the contribution
86. Briseno v. Chicago Union Station Co., 557 N.E.2d 196, 198 (111. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1990).
87. Id. (citing Vandygriff v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 408 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1980)).
88. 557 N.E.2d 196, 197 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 198.
92. Id. at 199.
93. 569 N.F di 1'23'- (Il. App. tct. 4th Dist. 1991).
94. Id. at 1234.
95. Id. at 1235.
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claim in determining whether the parties intended to preclude such
a claim.96 In particular, the Monical court focused on whether
both parties were to be named insureds under the contemplated
insurance policy and whether one bargaining party's liability,
which it sought to shift in the contribution claim, had
been fully
97
indemnified under the agreed-upon insurance policy.

C. Extinguishment of Co-Tortfeasors' Liability
The Contribution Act provides that a settlement given to one
tortfeasor does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability "unless its terms so provide."98 The Act further provides
that the right of contribution requires that the claimant extinguish
all co-tortfeasors' liability for the common injury. 99 These requirements of the Contribution Act raise additional recurring issues, including: (1) whether the terms of a settlement extinguish the cotortfeasors' liability; (2) whether an employer whose liability is
based solely on respondeat superior is released by operation of law
when the injured party and the employee enter into a settlement;
(3) whether the employer's worker's compensation benefit claim
must be extinguished in order to permit a contribution action
against him; and (4) whether the Act distinguishes between
tortfeasors who have been "released" and those who have "settled"
with the injured party.
1. Extinguishment of Liability in General
Pursuant to section 302(c) of the Contribution Act, a settlement
or release does not discharge other tortfeasors from liability unless
they are designated by name or otherwise specifically identified. In
Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. , the Illinois Supreme Court
held that an agreement, which in general language released all
other tortfeasors, was ineffective as a release of any individuals not
specifically named or identified in the agreement. The court observed that the Contribution Act was intended to abrogate the
common law rule that release of one tortfeasor released all
tortfeasors. 101 Accordingly, after Alsup, a release or settlement
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(c) (1989); see supra note I (setting forth the
Contribution Act).
99. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(e) (1989).
100. 461 N.E.2d 361, 364 (Il. 1984).
101. Id. at 363; see Rathke v. Albekier, 536 N.E.2d 864, 865-66 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1989); McNamara v. Shermer, 510 N.E.2d 950, 951 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987).
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agreement that purports to release certain classes of related
tortfeasors may not effectively extinguish liability of members of
the identified class unless they are specifically identified by name. 10 2
2. Vicarious Liability: Respondeat Superior
When primary liability against an employer is based solely upon
the negligence of an employee, one question is whether the employer is released from liability when the injured party settles with
the negligent employee.
In Stewart v. Village of Summit,10 3 the supreme court addressed
a covenant not to sue that contained a general reservation of rights
to sue all others who might be liable for the injured party's damages. The court rejected the argument that reservation of the right
to sue others required that the specific tortfeasors be named in the
agreement. " The court, however, specifically avoided the question of whether the release of the employee released the vicariously
liable employer as a matter of law. 0 5
Although avoided by the Stewart court, this issue was addressed
102. Alsup, 461 N.E.2d at 364; Stro-Wold Farms v. Finnell, 569 N.E.2d 1156, 1158
(I11.App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1991), reaffirming Pearson Bros. v. Allen, 476 N.E.2d 73 (I11.
App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1985). In Stro-Wold, the Otts purchased 83 hogs from Stro-Wold, a
partnership, which had purchased the hogs from Zimmerman. Stro-Wold, 569 N.E.2d at
1157. Defendant Finnell, a veterinarian, executed an Illinois Health Certificate, which
certified that he had inspected these hogs and found them to be free of any infections and
free from any contagious or communicable diseases. Id. After the hogs were delivered to
the Otts, the Otts lost their entire group due to swine dysentery. Id. The Otts settled
with Stro-Wold and Zimmerman for $100,000, executing a release that discharged them
and "their heirs, agents, servants, successors, executors, administrators, and all other persons." Id. Stro-Wold and its insurer thereafter brought a contribution claim against
Finnell, claiming he was an "agent" of Zimmerman whose liability was discharged by
this release. Id. The appellate court held that the "agents" designation in the release was
not specific enough to release Finnell. Id. at 1158. The court held that the release did not
effectively discharge Finnell's liability because " 'a release must specifically identify the
other tortfeasors [released] in order to discharge their liability' " and that the word
"agent" in the settlement agreement was not specific enough to satisfy this requirement.
Id. (quoting Alsup, 461 N.E.2d at 364) (emphasis added).
103. 499 N.E.2d 450, 453 (Ill. 1986).
104. Id.; see also Ledesma v. Cannonball, Inc., 538 N.E.2d 655, 660 (I11. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1989) (holding that the plaintiff's covenant not to sue the defendant, which expressly reserved the right to sue the defendant's employer, did not extinguish the employer's potential liability under a theory of respondeat superior).
105. Stewart, 499 N.E.2d at 453. The Stewart court observed that the principal case
fell between two pre-Contribution Act cases. Id. at 457. In Holcomb v. Flavin, 216
N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ill. 1966), the court held that a covenant not to sue the employee, which
contained no reservation of rights to sue others, released the ,, _i .iy
iiaole employer.
However, in Edgar County Banle -:, Trust Co. v. Paris Hosp., Inc., 312 N.E.2d 259, 261
(Ill. 197.), th. court concluded that a reservation clause which specifically named the
employer did not extinguish the injured party's action against the employer. In Stewart,
of course, there was a reservation clause, but it did not specifically reserve the plaintiff's
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by both the Second and the Fourth Districts of the Illinois Appellate Court. In Bristow v. Griffitts Construction Co., 1°6 the Fourth
District held that a covenant not to sue an employee released the
employer from liability to the injured party. The court reached its
decision by first examining whether implied indemnity survived the
passage of the Contribution Act. 107 Finding that implied indemnity remained a viable theory of recovery for an employer whose
liability is solely derivative, the court concluded that the settling
employee would gain nothing by his settlement if he was later required to indemnify his employer for damages paid by the employer to the injured party.108 Thus, to give substance to the
employee's settlement, the court concluded that an agreement that
does not expressly reserve the injured party's action against the
employer releases the employer from liability.1°9
However, in Brady v. PrairieMaterial Sales, Inc., 11 the Second
District Illinois Appellate Court reached a contrary conclusion.
Although the plaintiff in Brady signed an agreement with the employee that purported to release all other persons from liability, the
court held that unless the terms of the agreement specifically released the employer, the settlement with the employee had no effect on the employer's continued liability."' The Brady court
disagreed with the Bristow rationale and based its decision primarily on the notion that section 302(c), as interpreted by Alsup, limits
the effect of a settlement to 2those persons specifically named or
identified in the agreement."

The split of authority reflected by Bristow and Brady may prove
relatively insignificant in practice. As Justice Morthland noted in
his dissent in Bristow, few employers are sued only on a theory of
vicarious liability. 3 Thus, the Bristow holding will be undercut
when the plaintiff also sues on a theory of negligent hiring or negligent entrustment.
3.

Limited to Liability in Tort

A co-tortfeasor who settles with the plaintiff must extinguish all
claim against the employer. Thus, the Stewart decision leaves pointedly unresolved the
effect of the Contribution Act on these pre-Act decisions.
106. 488 N.E.2d 332, 338 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1986).
107. Id. at 336-37.
108. Id. at 338.
109. Id.
110. 546 N.E.2d 802, 810 (Il1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Bristow, 488 N.E.2d at 338 (Morthland, J., dissenting).
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outstanding tort claims against the other co-tortfeasors in order to
seek contribution." 4 In Hall v. Archer-Daniels-MidlandCo.," 5 the
supreme court held that the liability to be extinguished under section 302(e) must have a tort basis. Thus, the court found that the
settling party need not extinguish6 liability to an employer for its
worker's compensation benefits." 1
4.

"Release" or "Settles": Synonymous Terms

Although the Contribution Act uses the terms "release" and
"settles" in different contexts, the terms are synonymous when assessing the consequences of either a release or a settlement of the
underlying claim. In Brown v. Union Tank Car Co.," the court
rejected the argument that the Contribution Act distinguishes between a tortfeasor who receives a "release" from the injured party
and one who "settles" with that party. In Brown, a multi-party
settlement released one of the tortfeasors under terms that required
it to pay nothing to the injured party."' The third-party plaintiff
argued that, to avoid contribution, a tortfeasor must give the injured party some form of compensation.' ' 9 Turning on a subtle
distinction found in the Contribution Act, the argument was that a
person may be "released" from liability under section 302(c) and
thereby avoid liability to the injured party, but one only avoids
contribution under section 302(d) by "settling" with the plaintiff.'2 0 The unarticulated supposition here was that one "settles" a
claim by actually paying for its release. The court rejected this
argument, concluding that such an interpretation would frustrate
one of the underlying purposes
of the Act, which is to encourage
2
finality in settlements.' '
D. A Party Seeking Contribution Must Pay More
Than Its Pro Rata Share
The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who
22
has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability.
114. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(e) (1989).
115. 524 N.E.2d 586, 589 (I11. 1988).
116. Id.; see also Puckett v. Empire Stove Co., 539 N.E.2d 420, 428 (I11.App. Ct. 5th
Dist. 1989) (stating that joint tortfeasor's liability must be extinguished by the
settlement).
117. 554 N.E.2d 595, 597 (I11.App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1990).
118. Id. at 596.
119. Id. at 597.
120

'd.

121.
122.

Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(b) (1989).
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Accordingly, this section examines when the tortfeasor has paid
more than a fair share of the common liability and considers the
tortfeasor's burden of proof on this issue.
1. Calculation and Payment of Pro Rata Share
In the absence of fraud or other tortious conduct, an employer
may enter into a settlement with an employee and thereby avoid
liability for contribution.' 23 Any subsequent tort recovery, however, must be reduced by the value of the worker's compensation
124
lien waived by the employer as part of the settlement.
In Cleveringa v. J.I. Case Co.,125 the plaintiff and his employer

entered into a settlement in which the employer waived enforcement of its worker's compensation lien, except with respect to
compensation received from one of the nonsettling co-defendants.
The court held that such "selective enforcement" of the lien
126
neither evidenced b~d faith nor constituted a loan agreement.
Further, because the employee was liable to repay the employer
from compensation received from the exempted, non-settling defendant, the court would not reduce any judgment
rendered by the
127
value of the worker's compensation lien.
In Schoonover v. InternationalHarvester Co. ,128 the court considered the effect of a loan receipt agreement which compensated the
plaintiff in an amount greater than that received in a jury verdict
against a non-settling defendant. The plaintiff entered into a loan
receipt agreement whereby he received $300,000 with the under129
standing that it would be repaid under certain listed conditions.
Specifically, the court found that a minimum of $250,000 would be
forgiven under the loan. 130 Subsequently, the plaintiff was awarded
a verdict of $50,000 and the defendant sought to apply the amount
forgiven under the loan to its verdict-in effect, reducing the verdict to zero. 13 ' The court noted that the Contribution Act works

to avoid double recovery and is premised on the notion that the
123. Mallaney v. Dunaway, 533 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1988); see
also Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 524, 527-29 (Ill. 1989) (discussing the
requirement that settlement agreements be made in good faith).
124. Wilson, 546 N.E.2d at 532.
125. 549 N.E.2d 877, 878-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989).
126. Id. at 880.
127. Id.
128. 525 N.E.2d 1041, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1044.
131. Id. at 1043-44.
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plaintiff is entitled to compensation, not to windfall profits. 32
Thus, the court held that a valid loan receipt agreement will be
treated like any other settlement amount to the extent that any
portion of the loan is unconditionally forgiven. 3 3 Since the plaintiff received an unconditional loan that exceeded the amount of the
34
verdict, the court reduced the plaintiff's judgment to zero.1
2.

Pro Rata Share: Procedures Applicable to Trial of
Contribution Actions

In Victory Memorial HospitalAss'n v. Schmidt, Garden & Erickson, 135 the court considered the third-party plaintiff's burden of
proof in a contribution action. At trial, the defendant/third-party
plaintiff proved that the third-party defendant was a co-tortfeasor,
but did not prove the specific amount paid to settle the injured
party's underlying claim. 36 The third-party plaintiff argued that
the jury in the contribution action was merely to assign a percentage of fault to the respective co-tortfeasors.1 37 Subsequently, he
argued that the court could take notice of the settlement amount
and give the third-party plaintiff judgment for that 3amount which
exceeded the third-party plaintiff's pro rata share. 1
The court in Victory Memorial held that the third-party plaintiff
must allege and prove the specific amount paid in settlement of the
joint tortfeasors' liability and prove the parties' respective pro rata
share of the common injury. "39 The court found the case similar to
Houser v. Witt, 40 in which the court held the third-party plaintiff
to have the burden of proving an appropriate allocation between
the settlement amounts given a culpable husband and a non-culpable wife.
In Mallaney v. Dunaway,'4' the court rejected the argument that
a settling tortfeasor's pro rata share should be determined, not by
the amount paid to the injured party to settle the underlying claim,
but by an independent assessment of the actual damages suffered
by the injured party at the hands of the settling tortfeasor. The
132.

Id. at 1042-43 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(c) (1985)).

133. Id. at 1044.
134. Id. at 1045; see also Greco v. Coleman, 531 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th
Dist. 1988) (requiring no reduction of the verdict when the entire loan must be repaid).
135. 511 N.E.2d 953, 955-58 (111. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1987).
136. Id. at 955.
137. Id. at 956.
138. Id.
i 3.

Id.

140.
141.

443 N.E.2d 725, 727 (Il1. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1982).
533 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1988).
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defendant in contribution attempted to show that the injured
party's actual damages exceeded the settlement figure in hopes of
showing that the plaintiff in contribution did not pay more than
the actual damages caused by his conduct.142 The court in Mallaney rejected this argument, concluding that the parties' respective pro rata shares should be determined by the amount actually
paid to the injured party and not by143
reference to what the injured
party might have recovered at trial.

In addition, the supreme court stated in Hall v. Archer-DanielsMidland Co. 144 that the settling parties' allocation of damages as
compensation for a particular tort is not binding in a subsequent
contribution trial. In Hall, the third-party defendant argued that
the settlement was, in part, a ruse whereby payment of punitive
145
damages was improperly characterized as compensatory relief.
The court held that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
damages are allocable to the common injury and are not an at146
tempt to shift liability for punitive damages.
III.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE FILING OF
CONTRIBUTION ACTIONS

Section 305 of the Contribution Act permits the tortfeasor to
raise a claim for contribution either as a counterclaim in the under147
lying action on primary liability or in an independent action.

Part III is presented in five sections and considers the following
matters: the timeliness of a contribution action under the Act; the
effect of various statutes of repose and limitation on the timeliness
of a contribution action; the trial court's authority to order the
filing or severance of a contribution action in the underlying action; and various venue considerations pertaining to actions filed
against a municipality or against the State of Illinois.
A.

Timeliness: Contribution Claim Filed in the Underlying
Action on Primary Liability
The Contribution Act has its own statute of limitations, which
provides that "an action for contribution among joint tortfeasors
...

with respect to any payment made in excess of a party's pro

rata share" must be brought within two years "after the party seek142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 1115.
Id. at 1117.
524 N.E.2d 586, 591-92 (I11.
1988).
Id.
Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 305 (1989).

430
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ing contribution has made such payment towards discharge of his
or her liability."' 48 The number of cases this statute governs was
greatly reduced, however, by the 1984 Illinois Supreme Court decision Laue v. Leifheit. 4 9 Laue interpreted section five of the Contribution Act to require that a party defendant who might have a
contribution claim in a pending case must assert the claim in that
case or be barred from asserting it thereafter.150 The purpose behind the Laue holding was judicial economy-to resolve all questions of responsibility and fault in one proceeding, by one jury. 151
After Laue, the only claims specifically governed by the contribution statute of limitations are those claims arising out of settlements of primary claims that have not been the subject of
litigation.
Thus, under Laue, contribution claims must be asserted during
pending litigation. 52 Consistent with the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure,"3 courts have ruled that contribution claims should be
filed contemporaneously with the party's answer. 54 Thereafter,
any amendment that seeks to add a contribution claim may be filed
only by leave of the court.' 55 The critical limitations question,
then, is whether the trial court will grant leave to file a contribution claim after the party's time to file a contribution claim as of
right has expired.
On these procedural questions, Illinois appellate courts review
trial court decisions under an abuse of discretion standard. The
appellate cases-particularly Long v. Friesland5 6 and Grimming v.
Alton & Southern Railway 157 -utilize a test that in essence embodies the classic laches standard.' 58 This test asks two questions:
first, whether the contribution plaintiff-claimant unreasonably
delayed the assertion of his claim (in particular, did he have notice
of a potential claim);'5 9 and second, whether that delay prejudiced
the contribution defendant.' 6° Using these standards, appellate
148. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-204 (1989).
149. 473 N.E.2d 939 (Ill. 1984).
150. Id. at 941.
151. Id. at 942.
152. Id. at 941-42.
153. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-406(b) (1989).
154. Betkevicius v. Hart, 482 N.E.2d 382, 383 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1985); see Lesnak v. City of Waukegan, 484 N.E.2d 1285, 1286 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1985).
155. Long v. Friesland, 532 N.E.2d 914, 925 (I11. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1988).
156. Id.
157. 562 N.E.2d 1086 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1990).
5........
62 N. .2 a i i62; Long, 3SL N.E.2d at 925.
159. See Long, 532 N.E.2d at 925.
160. See Grimming, 562 N.E.2d at 1102.

New Developments in Contribution

1992]

courts have upheld trial court refusals to allow a contribution
claim first asserted on the eve of trial, during trial, or even after
6

trial. , 1

The recent supreme court case of Winter v. Henry Service Co. ,162
however, suggests a different test for allowing the filing of contribution claims. In Winter, after eight years of discovery and a trial
that resulted in a mistrial, the primary defendants asked leave to
assert a contribution claim against the plaintiff's father. 63 The
supreme court upheld the trial court's refusal to grant leave to file
the contribution claim.164 The supreme court relied solely on the
conclusion that the primary defendants had unreasonably delayed
the bringing of the contribution claim because they had notice of a
possible contribution claim long before the first trial.' 65 Nowhere
did the court discuss whether the contribution defendant was
prejudiced by the unreasonable delay, and in reality, there was little or no prejudice since the plaintiff's entire family was involved,
one way or another, in the initial lawsuit. 66 One could argue that
the court assumed that an eight-year delay automatically established prejudice, or that the abuse of discretion standard of review
allowed the court to assume prejudice, because the trial court
could have found prejudice on these facts without abusing its discretion. But the fact remains that the court did not discuss prejudice and did not indicate that prejudice was a factor in determining
67
whether the denial of leave "furthered the ends of justice."'1
However, given the significance of the leave to file a late contribution claim as a limitations question, it seems that the full traditional standard of laches should be applied. The appellate courts
have applied this standard correctly; thus, the ambiguities in the
Winter case should be interpreted liberally so that the holding is
consistent with a laches standard. In any event, a trial court using
the full laches standard probably will not be reversed on appeal
since the standard of review is abuse of discretion.
A second timeliness problem may arise as a result of the decision
161. See, e.g., id. at 1096 (upholding the trial court's revocation of a third-party claim
filed on the day of trial).
162. 573 N.E.2d 822, 824 (Ill. 1991).
163. Id. at 823. In Winter, a farm accident caused the injury, and the contribution
claim by the product liability defendants asserted negligence in failing to install a protective screen over the drive shaft in a grain auger. Id. at 824.
164. Id. at 825.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 824-25.
167. Id. at 824.
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in Henry v. St. John's Hospital.168 In Henry, the jury returned a
verdict allocating 93% of the fault underlying an $8,511,759 damage award to the defendant-contribution plaintiffs and 7% of that
fault to the defendants-contribution defendants.' 69 While the case
was on appeal, the 93%-at-fault contribution plaintiff settled for
$3.35 million, and the trial court upheld the settlement as being in
good faith.'70 In post-judgment proceedings, the 7%-at-fault defendants were responsible for the remainder of the verdict-$5.51
million in compensation damages and $1.53 million in interest, accruing steadily.' 7 ' The supreme court held that, because the contribution defendants had not filed a contribution counterclaim,
they had no contribution claim against the 93%-at-fault contribution plaintiffs.' 72 The question of whether the settlement was in
good faith was therefore irrelevant, because if there is no contribution claim preserved, it does not matter whether a settlement is in
good faith. Thus, since the old rules of joint and several liability
apply, a plaintiff with a judgment against two or more joint
tortfeasors can still enforce it fully against whichever joint
tortfeasor the plaintiff
chooses, pursuant to section 304 of the Con73
Act.
tribution
The Henry decision may provide a justification for contribution
defendants' attorneys to file late counterclaims for contribution
against contribution plaintiffs. Courts ought to allow these late
claims because, by definition, a contribution plaintiff is not
prejudiced by a late-filed contribution counterclaim by the contribution defendant, since the 7issues
will be the same in both the
4
claim and the counterclaim.
168.

563 N.E.2d 410 (Ill. 1990).

169.

Id. at 412.

170. Id. at 412-13.
171. Id. at 413. The case was filed before the 1986 several liability statute limited the
liability of less-than-25%-at-fault tortfeasors to several liability. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 2-1117 (1989).
172. Henry, 563 N.E.2d at 416.
173. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 304 (1989) ("A plaintiff's right to recover the full
amount of his judgment... is not affected by the provisions of this Act."); see supra note
1 (setting forth the Contribution Act).
174. This rationale suggests an alternative resolution of the Henry case as well. The
7%-at-fault defendants should have moved for leave to file a late contribution counterclaim after the post-judgment settlement. The court should have granted leave to amend
because there was absolutely no prejudice to the counterclaim contribution defendant in
the late filing, as the very issues raised by the counterclaim were at issue in the original
contribution claim. The supreme court could have invited such a motion, on appeal, and

!1=.............
.....
. ui-judgment, gooo faith critena should be
much stricter than pre-judgment good faith criteria, as post-judgment settlements such as
the one in Henry threaten to undermine the basic purposes of the Contribution Act.
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B.

Statutes of Repose and Limitation

A contribution action is time barred when it is not filed within
the limitation period established by a statute of repose or limitation
designed to protect the third-party defendant. As noted above, a
contribution action generally is timely if filed during the pendency
of the underlying primary action.
1. Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose
In Hayes v. Mercy Hospital and Medical Center,1 5 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the statute of repose applicable to medical malpractice actions 7 6 barred all claims, including those for
contribution, not filed within the proscribed limitation period of
repose. The court held that the statute's reference to claims "based
upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise" embraced contribution claims and that the legislature intended to protect physicians
(and their insurance carriers) from indefinite exposure to malpractice liability.177

The court rejected the argument that the Laue

holding and the two-year statute of limitations governing contribution actions 7 8 superseded the medical malpractice statute of repose.' 7 9 The court reasoned that to exempt contribution actions
from the medical statute of repose would substantially thwart the
benefits intended to be conferred by the period of repose."' 0
175. 557 N.E.2d 873, 876-77 (Ill. 1990).
176. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-212(a) (1989). Section 13-212(a) provides in
pertinent part:
Except as provided in Section 13-215 of this Act, no action for damages for
injury or death against a physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital duly
licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of
contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more than 2
years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence
of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of
such date occurs first, but in no event shall such action be brought more than 4
years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged
in such action to have been the cause of such injury or death.
Id.
177. Hayes, 557 N.E.2d at 877 (emphasis added).
178. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-204 (1989).
179. Hayes, 557 N.E.2d at 877-78.
180. Id. at 878. The Hayes decision resolves a split of authority on the issue of the
constitutionality of statutes of repose in medical malpractice cases and overrules Antunes
v. Samerng Sookhakitch, 537 N.E.2d 333 (11. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989). In Antunes, the
third-party plaintiff was joined after the repose period had elapsed. Id. at 334. Thus, it
was impossible for the third-party plaintiff to file a timely claim if measured by the statute
of repose. The court in Antunes concluded that it would be fundamentally unfair to allow
the plaintiff to join a person as a defendant in the primary action, but deny that same
person his right to contribution based solely on when the plaintiff chose to join him as a
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In Vogt v. Corbett,'' the supreme court reaffirmed its Hayes
holding that third-party actions for contribution against doctors
are subject to the medical malpractice statute of repose. The only
additional argument raised by the contribution plaintiff in Vogt
was whether Hayes was consistent with the supreme court's earlier
decision in Stephens v. McBride, 1 2 which held that the notice requirements of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act 8 3 are not applicable to actions for
contribution against governmental entities. The notice provision of
that Act was not applicable in Vogt, and the supreme court easily
resolved the purely theoretical inconsistency by pointing out that
the notice provisions at issue in Stephens were enacted before the
recognition of contribution claims in Illinois. Therefore, the notice
provisions were not intended to apply to contribution actions,
whereas the medical malpractice statute of repose, enacted after
recognition of contribution actions, was intended to apply to con84
tribution claims.1
In Roberson v. Belleville Anesthesia Associates, Ltd.,185 the appellate court extended the Hayes holding to a third-party implied indemnity claim based on a medical malpractice theory. The court
reasoned that since an indemnitor is obligated to the injured party
for the damages directly resulting from his negligence, an "action
for implied indemnity [but not express indemnity] is just as much
an action for damages as is an action for contribution under [the
86
statute of repose]." 1
2.

Statute of Repose for Construction Claims

The Hayes decision noted that construction-related litigation
was covered by a statute of repose 8 7 similar to that applicable to
defendant. Id. at 337. Ultimately, the Antunes court concluded that the statute of repose
did not apply to contribution claims; that the legislature did not intend to bar contribution claims under the terms of the statute; and that maintenance of a contribution claim
after the period of repose did not negate the benefits of the repose period. Id. at 337-38.
181. 563 N.E.2d 447, 449 (Ill. 1990).
182. 455 N.E.2d 54, 58 (Ill. 1983).
183. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, paras. 8-101 to 8-103 (1989).
184. Vogt, 563 N.E.2d at 449.
185. 571 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1991).
186. Id.
187. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-214(b) (1989). Section 13-214(b) provides in
pertinent part:
No action based upon tort, contract or otherwise may be brought against any
ran..act. l mnu1il f buci person in the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property after 10 years have elapsed from the time of such act
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medical malpractice actions.""8 Moreover, the Hayes court noted
the trial court's reliance on HartfordFireInsurance Co. v. Architectural Management, Inc.,189a case in which the court held that contribution actions involving construction-related litigation must be
filed within the periods of limitation contained in the construction
claim statute of repose. 190 Thus, given the Hayes decision and the
similarity in text and legislative history between the medical malpractice and construction claim statutes of repose, there is little
doubt that contribution actions growing out of construction-related litigation must be filed consistently with the statute of repose
promulgated to protect the construction industry.' 9'
3.

Statute of Repose for Product Liability Claims

In Thompson v. Walters, 192 the court held that the product liability statute of repose' 9 3 applies to product liability contribution
claims. The defendants/third-party plaintiffs in Thompson made
two important arguments. First, they argued that the contribution
claim was not a "product liability action" within the meaning of
or omission. However, any person who discovers such act or omission prior to
expiration of 10 years from the time of such act or omission shall in no event
have less than 4 years to bring an action as provided in subsection (a) of this
Section.
Id.
188. Hayes v. Mercy Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 557 N.E.2d 873, 874 (Ill. 1990).
189. 511 N.E.2d 706 (I1l. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987).
190. Hayes, 557 N.E.2d at 874 (citing Hartford, 511 N.E.2d at 706).
191. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Edward M. Cohon & Assocs., 532 N.E.2d 314, 319
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988) (holding that an engineering firm's contribution action
against a subcontractor was barred by statute of repose).
192. 565 N.E.2d 1385, 1387 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1990). In 1987, the plaintiff in
Thompson sued defendant landowners for injuries incurred in 1985, allegedly caused by a
defect in the defendants' swimming pool. Id. at 1386. Defendants then filed a third-party
contribution complaint, based on strict liability for the sale of a defective product, against
Sears, which had sold the defendants the pool prior to 1964. Id. Sears filed a motion to
dismiss based on the twelve-year-from-date-of-first-sale or ten-year-from-date-of-sale-toinitial-user statute of repose for product liability actions. Id. The trial court denied the
motion. Id. On interlocutory appeal, the appellate court reversed. Id. at 1390.
193. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-213 (1989 & Supp. 1990). Section 13-213(b)
provides in pertinent part:
[N]o product liability action based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort shall
be commenced except within the applicable limitations period and, in any event,
within 12 years from the date of first sale, lease or delivery of possession by a
seller or 10 years from the date of first sale, lease or delivery of possession to its
initial user, consumer, or other non-seller, whichever period expires earlier, of
any product unit that is claimed to have injured or damaged the plaintiff, unless
the defendant expressly has warranted or promised the product for a longer
period and the action is brought within that period.

436

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 23

that term as defined by the special statute of repose. 94 In particular, the defendants/contribution plaintiffs argued that a contribution action is not specifically an action to recover for an injury,
since the purpose of contribution is only to apportion liability for
tortious conduct among those responsible for an injury.' 9" However, the appellate court rejected this argument, pointing out that
the statute refers not to any action for personal injuries, but to any
action "on account of personal injuries," and thus obviously covers
contribution claims. 196 In interpreting the product liability statute
of repose, the Thompson court noted the similarities between its
purpose and language and the purpose and language of the medical
malpractice statute of repose interpreted by the supreme court in
Hayes. The court quoted the Hayes court's argument that a contribution action is an "action for damages" within the meaning of the
medical malpractice statute of repose, and concluded that the same
reasoning applied in Thompson to reject the defendants/contribution plaintiffs' attempted distinction of an action for apportionment
of damages from an action for damages.197
The second argument of the defendants/third-party plaintiffs in
Thompson was more persuasive, because it was based on a specific
limiting provision in the product liability statute of repose that had
no corollary in the medical malpractice statute of repose applied by
the court in Hayes. Subsection (f) of the product liability statute
provides that "[n]othing in this Section shall be construed to create
a cause of action or to affect the right of any person to seek and
obtain indemnity or contribution." 98 The court decided, however,
that this provision did not preclude application of the product liability statute to contribution claims.199 The court found that a contribution plaintiff urging a time-barred product liability claim has
no "right to seek and obtain... contribution" within the meaning
of subsection (f.200 The court held that subsection (f) only preserves the right of a product liability defendant, sued on a product
194. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-213(a)(3) (1989 & Supp. 1990). Section 13213(a)(3) states:
"[Piroduct liability action" means any action based on the doctrine of strict
liability in tort brought against the seller of a product on account of personal
injury, (including illness, disease, disability and death) or property, economic,
or other damage ....
Id.
195. Thompson, 565 N.E.2d at 1388.
196. Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-212 (1987)).
197. Id. (quoting Hayes, 557 N.E.2d at 876).
198. ILL. REV. STAT. b. lit 0
111(
ion
..i'.
199. Thompson, 565 N.E.2d at 1388-89.
200. Id. at 1390.
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liability claim within the statutory period, to assert a contribution
claim in the pending action without independent application of the
statutory limitation to the contribution claim. 20 The court stated
that the defendants/third-party plaintiffs' interpretation of subsection (f) to exempt all product liability contribution claims from the
statute of repose would defeat the basic purpose of the statute. 0 2
That purpose is to completely insulate sellers from the risk of product liability claims asserted for the first time over ten years after
the sale to the original user or twelve years after the first sale.203
Thus, although the coverage provision is not susceptible to the
same interpretation the supreme court gave the medical malpractice statute of repose coverage provision, and despite the specific
savings provision, the appellate court in Thompson v. Walters held
that the statute of repose applied to product liability contribution
claims. 20 4 This result was based primarily on the "certainty purpose" of the statute. Certainty in these areas can be pursued with
more or less vigor, however, and the coverage provision of the
product liability statute of repose, plus the savings provision,
strongly suggest that the legislature did not intend to pursue certainty at the expense of barring otherwise timely contribution
claims.
4.

Local Government Statute of Limitations

In two companion cases decided on the same day, the Illinois
Appellate Court for the Fourth District decided that the special
one-year statute of limitations for claims against local government
units is not a statute of repose that bars contribution claims asserted more than one year after the plaintiff's primary injury. 20 5 In
Highland v. Bracken,2° the plaintiff, Highland, a passenger on a
City of Mattoon firetruck, was injured when the firetruck collided
with a car driven by defendant Bracken. After Highland brought
suit against Bracken, Bracken filed a contribution claim against the
City of Mattoon and one of its employees. 20 7 These third-party
defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
contribution action was barred by the one-year local government
201. Id. at 1389.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1389-90; see relevant text of 13-213(b) quoted supra note 193.
204. Thompson, 565 N.E.2d at 1390.
205. Bonfield v. Jordan, 560 N.E.2d 412, 415 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1990); Highland
v. Bracken, 560 N.E.2d 406, 411 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1990).
206. 560 N.E.2d 406, 407 (111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1990).
207. Id.
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statute of limitations, which provides that actions against a municipality must be filed within one year of the date of the underlying
2 8
injury. 0
The Highland court found that the statute applies to contribution claims, but held that the one-year period for a contribution
claim begins, not on the date the injury was received, but on the
date "the [contribution] cause of action accrued. '2 °9 The court defined this date to be either the date payment is made by a joint
obligor in excess of its pro rata share or the date the contribution
plaintiff is sued, thereby giving notice of the nature and the potential amount of the obligation.21 0
The court distinguished the local government statute of limitations from the medical malpractice statute of repose at issue in
Hayes on the ground that the local government statute of limitations starts the one-year time period from either the time of the
injury or the time the cause of action accrued. 21 ' The court
reasoned:
This indicates the legislature intended .. .the Immunity Act's
statute of limitations to run from either the date the injury occurred or the cause of action accrued. Since the [1986] amendment to the Immunity Act allows this statute to apply to any
action based on statute, such as the Contribution Act, this remains consistent with the Stephens court's observation that "a
contribution
action may accrue many years after the accident has
212
occurred."
According to the court, this accrual feature of the Local Government Immunity statute of limitations thus seems to distinguish it
from statutes of repose like the one at issue in Hayes:
A statute of repose is essentially different from a statute of limitations, in that a limitations statute is procedural, giving a time
limit for bringing a cause of action, with the time beginning when
the action has ripened or accrued; while a repose statute is a substantive statute, extinguishing any right of bringing the cause of
208. Id.; see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 8-101 (1989). Specifically, section 8-101
provides:
No civil action may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any
of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the
date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued. For purposes
of this Article, the term "civil action" includes any action, whether based upon
the common law or statutes or Constitution of this State.
Id.
209. Highland, 560 N.E.2d at 408.
210. Id. at 409.
211. Id. at 410.
212. Id. (quoting Stephens v. McBride, 455 N.E.2d 54, 55 (Ill. 1983)).
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action, regardless of whether it has accrued.2 13

In Bonfield v. Jordan,1 4 the companion case to Highland, the
court held that the one-year notice requirement in effect at the time
of the plaintiff's primary injury did not apply to a contribution
action that "accrued" after the notice requirement had been eliminated by the legislature. In reaching this result, the court used the
Highland accrual test.21 5
C. The Trial Court's Authority to Order the Filing of a
Contribution Claim During the Underlying Action on
Primary Liability
As noted earlier, the Laue decision requires that contribution
actions be filed during the pendency of the underlying claim for
primary liability.21 6 Such a requirement, the supreme court noted,
insures that the same trier of fact decides all questions of primary
and secondary liability. 2 7 Although contribution actions may be
untimely when raised during or after trial,21 s courts have never addressed the question of whether the trial court has the authority to
order the filing of contribution actions by a certain date before
trial. Recognizing the potential prejudice that a late-filed contribution action may have on a co-defendant's discovery efforts and trial
preparation, these authors suggest that the court's authority to
enter pretrial orders regulating the filing of amendments supports
the court's authority to limit the time within which contribution
actions may be filed.219
Despite the desirability of deciding all questions of primary and
secondary liability in one trial, the trial court has the authority to
sever contribution claims from the underlying action.22°
D. ContributionActions Against the State of Illinois
A contribution action against the State of Illinois must be
213. Id. at 411.
214. 560 N.E.2d 412, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1990).
215. Id. at 415 (citing Highland, 560 N.E.2d at 409-10).
216. Laue v. Leifheit, 473 N.E.2d 939, 940 (Ill. 1984); see supra notes 149-52 and
accompanying text.
217. Laue, 473 N.E.2d at 942.
218. See supra part III.A.
219. See Farnor v. Irmco Corp., 392 N.E.2d 591, 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979)
(noting that the trial court has discretion to allow amendments to be filed before final
judgment is entered).
220. Ryan v. E.A.I. Constr. Corp., 511 N.E.2d 1244, 1255 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1987).
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brought in the Court of Claims. 22' The Court of Claims Act provides that the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to hear
tort claims against the State.222
E.

Venue in ContributionActions Against Municipalities
The Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides that venue in an
action against a municipality is proper "in the county in which its
principal office is located or in the county in which the transaction
or some part thereof occurred out of which the cause of action
arose." 223 No reported decision has dealt with the potential conflict between venue provisions applicable to the underlying action
for primary liability and this section of the Code of Civil Procedure
specifically limiting venue in actions against municipalities.224
IV.

IMPLIED INDEMNITY AND EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT

The common law "no contribution rule," which existed before
Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. 22s and
the Contribution Act, was harsh and inequitable. Reflecting the
historic liberty of the plaintiff to collect all of the judgment from
any one of multiple co-tortfeasors, the "no contribution rule" allowed fortunate tortfeasors, not called upon by the plaintiff to pay,
to escape all responsibility for the judgment. In essence, a
tortfeasor's responsibility to satisfy the judgment depended on the
plaintiff's unilateral choice and certainly did not depend upon that
particular tortfeasor's culpability. Clearly, Illinois's adoption of
the right of contribution alters the relationship between cotortfeasors. However, even before the acceptance of contribution,
221. International Bureau of Fraud Control v. Clayton, 544 N.E.2d 416, 419 (Il1.
App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1989).
222. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 439.8 (1989 & Supp. 1990); see also Welch v.
Stocks, 503 N.E.2d 1079 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1987) (holding that the Court of Claims
has exclusive jurisdiction over a county's third-party action against the State); Byron v.
Village of Lyons, 500 N.E.2d 499 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986) (holding that the circuit
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain contribution actions against the State).
223. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-103(a) (1989).
224. In resolving this conflict, one might draw a rough analogy between the municipal venue provision and the Court of Claims Act exempting the state from the trial
court's general jurisdiction. As noted above, the supreme court has held that the state
may be sued for contribution only in the Court of Claims. InternationalBureau ofFraud
Control, 544 N.E.2d at 419. A municipality might argue that the same rationale should
protect it from suit outside of the proscribed counties. This result, of course, may require
that the underlying action and the contribution action be tried in different counties. On
the other hand, one might conclude that the legislature did not intend section 2-103(a) to
subvert the goals of consistency and judicial economy by requiring such a bifurcated
process.
225. 374 N.E.2d 437 (I11.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).

New Developments in Contribution

19921

Illinois courts sought to ameliorate some of the inequities resulting
from the "no contribution rule."
Part IV provides an overview of the pre-Contribution Act theories of implied indemnity and equitable apportionment. The material is presented in four sections: the first examines the historical
origins of implied indemnity in tort and quasi-contractual contexts;
the second explores the demise of the tort theory of implied indemnity after Allison v. Shell Oil Co. ;226 the third argues for the continued viability of the quasi-contractual theory of implied indemnity;
and the last part discusses the demise of equitable apportionment
in light of the Contribution Act.
A.

Quasi-Contractualand Tort Theories

In general, two theories emerged-one in contract, the other in
tort-from which exceptions to the no contribution rule later grew.
In Nelson v. Cook,227 the Illinois Supreme Court held that in certain contractual relationships, there is an implied promise to indemnify the other for any tort liability that might arise. Thus, an
employee or agent who was liable in tort to the injured party was
entitled to indemnification from the principal, provided the indemnitee was unaware that its conduct was wrongful.
The second theory providing exceptions to the no contribution
rule grew out of tort law. In Gulf Mobile & Ohio Railway v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co.,228 the court observed that the no contribution rule worked an injustice when one tortfeasor's conduct was
more egregious than the other's. The court stated that "[t]he
courts have, therefore had to find a way to do justice within the law
so that one guilty of an act of negligence-affirmative, active, primary in its character-will not escape scot-free, leaving another
whose fault was only technical or passive to assume complete liability.

' 229

Despite its recognition of the difficulty in defining the

distinction, the Gulf Mobile court concluded that a passive
tortfeasor was entitled to indemnification from an active (or more
blameworthy) tortfeasor. 230 Thus, the rationale for this doctrine

rested solely on the injustice in allowing the active tortfeasor to
escape liability.
Unlike the doctrine of contractually-implied indemnification re226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

495 N.E.2d 496 (Ill.
1986).
17 Ill.
443, 449 (1856).
98 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1951).
Id. at 787.
Id. at 787-88.
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flected in Nelson, the active-passive theory of indemnification is not
premised upon a pre-existing relationship that gives rise to an implied promise to indemnify the innocent indemnitee. Rather, the
Gulf, Mobile doctrine seeks to do justice by placing liability upon
the most blameworthy tortfeasor. Importantly, both theories shift
the entire liability to the disadvantaged tortfeasor; thus, the principal in Nelson and the active tortfeasor in Gulf, Mobile incurred
liability for the entire judgment.
B. Implied Indemnity Allison v. Shell Oil Co. and the Demise
of the Tort Theory of Indemnification Under the
Contribution Act
In Allison v. Shell Oil Co.,231 the Illinois Supreme Court held
that implied indemnity on an active-passive tortfeasor theory was
no longer a viable theory after the recognition of the right of contribution among co-tortfeasors. Acknowledging the inequities that
justified the recognition of implied indemnity on an active-passive
theory, the court reasoned that the doctrine no longer served a
valid purpose in light of the Contribution Act.232 The court specifically noted the absence of logic in permitting a negligent party,
albeit passively negligent, to shift completely its responsibility to
pay for its wrongful conduct.233
The Allison court expressly limited its holding to the active-passive component of the doctrine and cautioned that its decision did
not reach the broader question of whether the doctrine of implied
indemnity on a quasi-contractual theory continued to exist.234
Thus, the Allison court eliminated the tort theory of indemnification reflected in the Gulf, Mobile decision, but left unresolved the
question of whether the Nelson quasi-contractual theory was still
viable.
C. Implied Indemnity on a Quasi-ContractualTheory
The Illinois Supreme Court specifically rejected the viability of
implied indemnity when the indemnitee is at fault for the injured
party's damages.2 35 In such a situation, the court concluded that
culpable parties are only entitled to contribution under the Act,
231. 495 N.E.2d 496, 500 (Ill. 1986).
232. Id. at 501.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 500.
235. Frazer v. A.F. Munsterman, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 1248, 1256 (Il. 1988); Thatcher v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 527 N.E.2d 1261, 1263 (Ill. 1988).
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and are not entitled to indemnity. 36 The court, however, left open
the prospect that an indemnitee, liable solely on a derivative basis,
may be entitled to implied indemnity.237
In Frazer v. AF. Munsterman, Inc.,238 a downstream product
distributor was found to have been negligent in failing to inspect
the product. In an attempt to shift the liability, the distributor
sought implied indemnification from the upstream wholesaler and
manufacturer on the grounds of negligence, strict product liability,
and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.239 The
court held that implied indemnity was no longer a viable theory for
any co-tortfeasor who was found to have some measure of fault for
the plaintiff's injuries. 210 Reconsidering the holding in Allison, the
Frazercourt stated that "the fundamental premise for [implied indemnity] is that the indemnitee, although without fault in fact, has
been subjected to liability solely because of some legal relationship
with the plaintiff or a non-delegable duty arising out of common or
statutory law.1 241 The court concluded that a judicial finding that

the defendant was negligent precludes recovery under the theory of
implied indemnity.242
However, the Frazer opinion noted three parties who might be
entitled to implied indemnity: (1) a principal held vicariously liable for the acts of an agent; (2) a principal held vicariously liable
for the non-delegable acts of an independent contractor; and (3) a
downstream distributor or seller of a product found liable to the
injured party but on grounds that do not indicate personal fault.2 4 3
236. Frazer,527 N.E.2d at 1256; Thatcher, 527 N.E.2d at 1263.
237. Frazer,527 N.E.2d at 1255.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1249.
240. Id. at 1255.
241. Id. at 1251-52.
242. Id. at 1255; see Brown v. Torin Corp., 529 N.E.2d 1077, 1079 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1988).
243. Frazer, 527 N.E.2d at 1254-55. The implications of the Frazer decision for strict
product liability litigation should not be ignored. Justice Ryan's dissent in Frazersees a
darker side to the court's decision to deny indemnification to the distributor. Ryan argued that manufacturers will be encouraged by Frazer to settle with injured parties so as
to defeat contribution to a downstream distributor or seller-a result permitted, if not
encouraged, by the Frazer decision. Id. at 1260 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting). Thus, the manufacturer who is arguably more responsible for causing the injuries has a clear incentive to
settle with the plaintiff and leave the remaining portion of damages to the less culpable
downstream defendants. On the issue of culpability, Justice Ryan noted that the distributor had no hand in constructing the defect and is held liable only on a theory of a failure
to inspect-a theory which, parenthetically, had never been utilized to defeat a plaintiff's
recovery. Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting). Thus, the effect of Frazer,argued Justice Ryan, is to
permit manufacturers to escape the lion's share of liability for their defective products.
Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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Further, in Thatcher v. Commonwealth Edison Co. ,2 decided on
the same day as Frazer, the court again considered a claim for implied indemnity by a downstream product purchaser. As in Frazer,
the party seeking indemnification in Thatcher was sued in the underlying action on grounds that included both strict liability and
negligence. 245 However, unlike Frazer,no trier of fact decided the
party's culpability because, before trial, the defendants agreed to
pay the injured party a substantial sum to settle the claim.246 Subsequently, the settling party sought implied indemnity from the
product's manufacturer. 247 The Thatcher court concluded that despite the absence of a judicial finding of fault, the amount of the
settlement implicitly established that the underlying claim was settled to avoid an adverse finding of fault. 24 8 Thus, the court held
that implied indemnity was unavailable to a party whose settlement reflects its recognition of fault.249
The Second District Illinois Appellate Court in Diamond v. General Telephone Co. of Illinois250 found that a vicarious liability implied indemnity claim would be barred if the plaintiffs' theory of
liability in the primary action against the indemnity plaintiff was
not based on vicarious liability, even if the indemnity plaintiff was
subsequently found by the trier of fact to be not at fault.
In Diamond, the plaintiffs' decedents were killed in a freak accident while driving on an interstate highway adjacent to the
Diamonds' property.25 1 A telephone pole owned by General Telephone Company ("GTE") on the Diamonds' property did not
stand straight, but leaned over and was unrestrained by its single
guy wire.252 The telephone cable supported by the pole then
244. 527 N.E.2d 1261 (I11.1988).
245. Id. at 1262.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1263.
249. Id. In dissent, Justice Miller argued that this type of adverse inference drawn
merely from the fact that a party has settled a case runs contrary to the customary view
that settlements and offers of settlement are not taken as admissions or acknowledgements of fault. Id. at 1264 (Miller, J., dissenting); see Kemner v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 544
N.E.2d 124, 127 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1989) ("Because [defendant/indemnity plaintiff]
paid the plaintiffs $3,800,000 in settlement of their claims, and because plaintiffs' pleadings alleged specific acts of negligence on behalf of [defendant/indemnity plaintiff], we
find that Thatcher dictates that an indemnity action cannot be maintained by such a
defendant."); see also Van Berkum v. Christian, 530 N.E.2d 52, 56-57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1988) (holding that the defendant's implied indemnity claim was barred because the
counts against him alleged fault and the defendant settled with the plaintiff).
250. 569 N.E.2d 1263, 1268-69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1991).
251. Id. at 1265.
252. Id.
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sagged over the interstate, at a height of only six to seven feet. 253 A

tractor-trailer truck traveling on the interstate hit the sagging
cable.254 The cable pulled taught and broke the leaning pole,
which was hurled across the highway into plaintiffs' decedents'
van. 255 Plaintiffs sued the Diamonds for negligently plowing their
256
land close to the telephone pole so as to sever the guy wire.
Plaintiffs sued GTE in negligence for failing to secure the pole with
adequate guy wires, to warn landowners of the location of the guy
wires, and to guard the guy wires from damage.257
A jury absolved the Diamonds from liability and imposed all the
liability on GTE. 25 1 The Diamonds then brought an implied in-

demnity claim against GTE for settlement payments in a collateral
suit brought by the owner of the semi-trailer company. 25 9 The trial
court rejected the Diamonds' implied indemnity claim. 26 0 The ap-

pellate court affirmed, reasoning that the Diamonds could not have
a valid implied indemnity claim based on a vicarious liability theory because they had not been sued on a vicarious liability theory. 26' The court examined the underlying cause and determined

that it was based in negligence rather than on any "pretort relationship ...

or any express contractual basis. "262

In summary, the reasoning and holdings of Frazer, Thatcher,
and Diamond suggest that the Illinois courts may be willing to recognize the continuing viability of implied indemnity based on
quasi-contractual principles, where one party, wholly innocent of
any personal fault, is held liable only because of a derivative or
vicarious liability principle. But the indemnity plaintiff must have
followed procedures that positively rule out personal fault on its
part.
However, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District recently rejected that position and found that implied indemnity in
quasi-contractual principles did not survive adoption of the Contribution Act. In American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Brans253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1266.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1264.
261. Id. at 1268-69.
262. Id. The court recognized the "classic pretort relationships of owner-lessee or
lessor-lessee" as giving rise to a duty to indemnify. Id. at 1268.
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field,2 6 3 a patient, injured during an operation, sued the surgeon,
the anesthesiologist, and the hospital. The claim against the hospital included allegations of both individual fault and vicarious liability for the negligence of the surgeon and the negligence of the
anesthesiologist. 264 The plaintiff failed to identify an expert to testify as to individual fault on the part of the hospital. 265 The trial
court entered summary judgment for the surgeon.266 The anesthesiologist settled, and the trial court found the settlement to be in
good faith.267 Therefore, the trial court dismissed the implied indemnity claim by the hospital against the anesthesiologist.268
The appellate court upheld this dismissal on two grounds: first,
that quasi-contractual implied indemnity did not survive the adoption of contribution based on comparative fault; and second, that
the plaintiff's good faith settlement with the anesthesiologist precluded the hospital's implied indemnity claim.2 69 The court gave a
number of reasons for its conclusion that quasi-contractual implied
indemnity did not survive the adoption of contribution based on
comparative fault. 270 The most important reason was a practical
one-the impossibility of coordinating an implied indemnity system with the contribution system.27 '
The Bransfield court isolated a significant problem with the continued recognition of implied indemnity claims after the adoption
of the Contribution Act-how can implied indemnity claims be
meshed with the statutory contribution system? The court in
Bransfield was faced with the problem of reconciling the good faith
settlement provisions of the Contribution Act with continued recognition of the quasi-contractual implied indemnity claims in vicarious liability situations. If implied indemnity claims against an
agent are not barred by the plaintiff's good faith settlement with
the agent, then the Contribution Act aim of encouraging settlement is undermined. If, however, implied indemnity claims are
barred by the settlement and the plaintiff retains all his legal claims
against the principal when the principal is not named in the settle263.
(1991)
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

576 N.E.2d 1013, 1015 (Il. App. Ct. 1st Dist.), appeal granted, 142 111.2d 651
(Table No. 72521).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1015-16.
Id.
Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1016-19.
Id.
Id. at 1018.
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ment, then settlements seem to defeat the purpose of retaining implied indemnity for vicarious liability altogether.
There is, however, a rational way of reconciling these concerns
and accommodating the various policies. Courts could follow the
lead of the Fourth District in Bristow and give legal effect to a
settlement between the plaintiff and the agent that releases any
purely vicarious liability claim against the principal. This approach preserves both the settlement-encouragement aim of the
Contribution Act and the policy behind implied indemnity. If the
principal's claim for implied indemnity is not barred by settlement,
then: (1) the plaintiff's and agent's settlement is made meaningless
because of the plaintiff's agreement in the settlement to indemnify
the agent against any subsequent liability; and (2) the purpose of
releasing the defendant for the fixed, clearly-defined cost of settlement and, thus, of encouraging settlements, would be undermined.
The proposed rule avoids these undesirable consequences while retaining the desired 100%-0% allocation of implied indemnity for
vicarious liability.272 Under this approach, the result of Bransfield
is correct. The settlement would not only bar the implied indemnity claim by the hospital, but it also would bar any vicarious liability claim against the hospital.
Although Frazer and Thatcher give only indirect support for the
proposition,273 there is ample reason to argue that implied indemnity on a quasi-contractual basis was not abolished by the recognition of contribution. The policy considerations that prompted the
Nelson court to recognize such a right have not been diminished by
recognition of the right to contribution among co-tortfeasors. One
may still contend that the innocent party, liable only because of
another's blameworthy conduct, should be fully indemnified by the
wrongdoer. Thus, recognition of the right to contribution should
have no effect on the continued viability of implied indemnity in a
quasi-contractual context.
The argument for implied indemnity is bolstered further when it
272. In contrast, a settlement between the plaintiff and the principal should be given
the effect of releasing the agent from liability to the plaintiff and preserving the defendant's implied indemnity claim against the agent only if the agreement specifically names
that agent as a released party. In this situation, the indemnity interest of the principal is
indistinguishable from the contribution interests of other parties, and the settlement provisions of the Contribution Act allow the defendant (the principal here) to weigh his
interests in the implied indemnity claim, in settling the main claim, and in other economic concerns. There is no reason, therefore, why the Contribution Act resolution
should not be adopted fully in a case when the plaintiff settles with the principal.
273. See Frazer v. A.F. Munsterman, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 1248, 1251 (Ill. 1988);
Thatcher v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 527 N.E.2d 1261, 1263 (Il1. 1988).
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is recognized that contribution between the would-be indemnitee
and indemnitor is theoretically ill-suited to the task of addressing
the parties in a quasi-contractual context. Contribution is best understood as a means to assign to each tortfeasor liability for his pro
rata share of the plaintiff's injuries. Consequently, when one
tortfeasor pays more than his fair share, other co-tortfeasors must
contribute to make the amount paid equitable. In the quasi-contractual relationship, however, one cannot speak of the indemnitee's pro rata share as somehow distinct from the indemnitor's.
The pro rata share for a party who is vicariously liable is that
amount charged to its indemnitor. Thus, when the indemnitee is
forced to pay for the plaintiff's injuries, the indemnitee's entire
payment exceeds its pro rata share of fault for the injuries.
To illustrate the point, if one envisions a "contribution" action
between an indemnitee and indemnitor, the only sensible conclusion that can be drawn by the trier of fact is that the indemnitor
was 100% at fault for plaintiff's injuries, and the resulting judgment should permit the indemnitee to recoup 100% of the payment made. Thus, any attempt to apply the theory of contribution
to a quasi-contractual relationship leads to a result identical to that
of implied indemnity.
Yet precisely the opposite argument was accepted by the court
in Hackett v. Equipment Specialists, Inc.274 In Hackett, the plain-

tiff sued the manufacturer of an automatic corn husking machine
that mangled her arm at work. 275

The manufacturer filed a third-

party contribution complaint against the plaintiff's employer.276
The jury awarded compensatory damages in favor of the plaintiff
and against the manufacturer, assessing comparative fault percentages of 45% to the plaintiff for her assumption of the risk and 55%
to the manufacturer. 277 In the third-party contribution claim by

the manufacturer against the employer, the jury apportioned 100%
of the damages to the employer.278
The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial. 279 It

found that the 100% allocation of liability to the employer was
erroneous for two reasons.28 0 First, in finding the manufacturer
274. 559 N.E.2d 752 (Il. App. Ct. 1st Dist.), appeal denied, 564 N.E.2d 837 (Ill.
1990) (Table No. 70931).
275. Id. at 754.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 762.
280. Id. at 761-62.
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55%-at-fault in the primary claim, the jury necessarily found the
manufacturer to be an "active tortfeasor" whose fault proximately
caused the plaintiff's injuries. 81 The court held that the jury could
not thereafter consistently allocate 100% of the fault to the employer in the contribution claim, because the manufacturer was
"only entitled to contribution to the extent plaintiff's injury was
caused by" the employer and not by the manufacturer.282
Second, the court determined that the 100%-0% allocation was
equivalent to an indemnity conclusion, which by definition shifts
100% of the liability from the indemnitee to the indemnitor.283
But the facts in Hackett cannot support an implied indemnity
claim under the Doyle v. Rhodes list of remaining valid implied
indemnity claims in product liability cases.28 4 This is true because
the jury found that the manufacturer's active fault was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, and the manufacturer was not
found vicariously liable for the fault of another. Therefore, as a
matter of law, the jury's l00%-0% allocation was in error.28 5
Hackett is certain to be a controversial decision. One can argue
that the court's decision of the question as a matter of law is erroneous because a reasonable jury, assuming that the manufacturer's
fault proximately caused the plaintiff's injury, could still conclude
that the employer's fault was over 200 times greater, thus leading,
after rounding off, to the 100%-0% allocation. The court's only
response to this argument came in its response to the manufacturer's reliance on Pipes v. American Logging Tool Corp.:286
Defendant also relies on Pipes for the principle that the jury can
place the loss in proportionate amounts on those whose actions
proximately cause the injury without traditional labels characterizing the kind of fault involved. However, even there the jury
attributed 10% fault to the employer and 90% fault to the manufacturer of the defective product.28 7
It is not immediately clear, however, why a jury is allowed to make
281. Id.
282. Id. at 761.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 761-62 (observing that the right of indemnity or total contribution may
exist where "one held liable for failing to correct a dangerous condition may seek full
contribution from the party whose conduct was the sole proximate cause of the injury by
creating the unreasonably dangerous condition") (citing Doyle v. Rhodes, 461 N.E.2d
382 (Il1. 1984)).
285. Id.
286. 487 N.E.2d 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1985).
287. Hackett, 559 N.E.2d at 762 (citation omitted).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 23

a 9-to-i or 99-to-1 comparative fault judgment under the Pipes
principle but not a 201-to-i judgment.
The inconsistent verdict problem in Hackett may be avoided in
all cases when the contribution defendant may be held directly liable to the primary plaintiff. The problem may recur only in cases
like Hackett, when the contribution defendant is immune from direct liability to the primary plaintiff. In addition, the 100% allocation of liability to the employer in a contribution claim would
ordinarily be ruled out by the Kotecki limitation on the employer's
contribution liability.28 8
D. Equitable Apportionment: Demise of the Concept in Light of
the Right to Contribution
Before Illinois recognized the right to contribution, courts permitted an apportionment of damages when a second tortfeasor
merely aggravated the injured party's condition by causing a second, severable injury. 2 9 The original tortfeasor, however, remained liable for both the original and subsequent injuries.29
Thus, the original tortfeasor was permitted to recover for any payment made for damages that in fact were caused solely by the second tortfeasor's conduct, thereby effecting a pro rata
apportionment of liability.29 ' In 1986, however, the court in Mayhew Steel Products, Inc. v. Hirschfelder292 held that the Contribution Act abolished the common law concept of equitable
apportionment.29 s
V.

GOOD FAITH SETILEMENTS-BARS TO THE RIGHT OF
CONTRIBUTION

The Contribution Act provides that a tortfeasor who settles with
a claimant pursuant to section 302 is discharged from all liability
for any contribution to any other tortfeasor.294 Part V considers
two broad questions concerning good faith settlements: (1) what
constitutes a good faith settlement under the Act; and (2) what
288. See supra part II.A.3.c.
289. See Gertz v. Campbell, 302 N.E.2d 40 (I11.1973).
290. Id. at 43.
291. Id. at 44.
292. 501 N.E.2d 904 (I11.App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1986).
293. Id. at 907; see also Cleggett v. Zapianin, 543 N.E.2d 892 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1989) (holding that the Contribution Act extinguishes actions for implied indemnity that
might serve to impede settlement and thus interfere with the central purpose of the Act).
294. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(e) (1989). Section 302(e) is set forth supra
note 1.
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process and procedural rights must be accorded the non-settling
tortfeasor who seeks to challenge the good faith basis of a
settlement.
A.

Good Faith Settlements

A settlement executed in good faith discharges the settling party
from its obligation to contribute to any other joint tortfeasor.295 In
determining whether an agreement is made in good faith within the
meaning of section 302(c), all surrounding circumstances must be
considered.296
The supreme court and various districts of the appellate court
have decided several cases in which the central question was
whether the settling party received sufficient consideration to support a finding of good faith. For example, in Ballweg v. City of
Springfield,297 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the settlement of
a claim that possibly was barred by a statute of limitations. The
court reasoned that while the suit remained outstanding, the parties were free to compromise the claim.298 Similarly, appellate
courts have searched to find that the parties actually sought to dispose of a disputed claim.299
In Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc. ,o the supreme court returned
to the issue of good faith in the context of a settlement between an
employee and employer. Recognizing that the employer had an
unquestioned right to assert its Worker's Compensation Act immunity 30 1 in the employee's common law suit for damages, the
court nonetheless held that a settlement that released the employer
from liability presumptively was not made in bad faith.30 2 Relying
on its prior rationale in Ballweg, the court concluded that the employer had a right to decide whether its interests were better pursued through a defense of the common law suit or its immunity
under the Act.3 °3 Accordingly, if defense of the suit was a permissible option, then settlement of that claim must also be
295. Bank v. R.D. Werner Co., 559 N.E.2d 217 (111. App. Ct. 1st. Dist. 1990).
296. Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 524, 529 (I11. 1989).
297. 499 N.E.2d 1373, 1380 (I11.1986).
298. Id.
299. See Pritchard v. SwedishAmerican Hosp., 557 N.E.2d 988 (I11. App. Ct. 2d Dist.
1990); McKanna v. Duo-Fast Corp., 515 N.E.2d 157, 162-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1987); O'Connor v. Pinto Trucking Serv. Inc., 501 N.E.2d 263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1986).
300. 546 N.E.2d 524 (I11. 1989).
301. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.30 (1989).
302. Wilson, 546 N.E.2d at 529.
303. Id. at 528-29.
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appropriate.
Justice Ryan, dissenting in Wilson, argued that the court's ruling
sanctioned settlements that function only to defeat the third-party
plaintiff's right to contribution. 0 5 He noted that the employer
faced no real liability to the injured employee and further asserted
that the settlement could only work to shield the employer from
contribution . 3a0 Justice Ryan's dissent raised questions of whether
a settling party should be discharged from contribution when there
is no consideration to support the settlement or when the claim
against the settling party could not be pursued successfully. 30 7
Indeed, one court has sustained a settlement that could only
serve to defeat the third-party plaintiff's right to contribution. In
Ellis v. E. W. Bliss & Co.,308 cited with approval in Wilson, 30 9 the
court approved a settlement even though it was executed after the
employer had successfully asserted its worker's compensation immunity in the underlying common law suit. 310 The appellate court
found that the settling party's liability for contribution constituted
sufficient consideration to support the settlement.31 1 The unarticulated premise of the Ellis decision seems to be that the injured
party need not give the settling party consideration for the settlement and that the only critical requirement is that the settling
party gain its release from liability for contribution.
In a similar vein, one court found a good faith settlement when
the settling party actually paid nothing. In Brown v. Union Tank
Car Co. ,312 the employer settled its claim with the injured employee
in an agreement which provided that the employer would waive its
right to enforce its worker's compensation lien. A simultaneously
executed agreement with a co-defendant, however, provided that
the employer would be reimbursed for the value of the lien
waiver. 313 Thus, the employer settled on terms under which it lost
nothing to secure its release. The court rejected the argument that
304. Id. at 529. Notably, the Wilson decision overruled LeMaster v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 442 N.E.2d 1367 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1982), and resolved the split in authority
that existed between LeMaster and Dixon v. Northwestern Publishing Co., 520 N.E.2d
932 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1988).
305. Wilson, 546 N.E.2d at 532 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
306. Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 532-33 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
308. 527 N.E.2d 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988).
309. Wilson, 546 N.E.2d at 528-29.
310. Ellis, 527 N.E.2d at 1024.
311. Id.
312. 554 N.E.2d 595, 595-96 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1990).
313. Id.
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the Contribution Act 3

14

requires a settling party to pay the injured

party in order to defeat the third party's right to contribution.315
Prompted by the Contribution Act's intent to foster settlements,
Illinois appellate courts generally hold that the trial court has wide
316
discretion to determine that a settlement is made in good faith.
Accordingly, the trial court may consider both the uncertainty of
liability and the speculative nature of the damages sought.31 7
Courts have held that a finding of good faith is not negated simply
because: (1) the terms of the settlement are advantageous to the
released party; 318 (2) the settlement reflects an apparent disproportionate division of liability between the settling and non-settling
defendants; 3 9 (3) the injured party's damages exceed the amount
of the settlement;320 (4) the settlement is very low compared to the
damages sought;3 2 1 or (5) the settling parties have a close

relationship. 22
A non-settling party must be protected against collusive settlements, but the Contribution Act does not require that the settlement agreement be measured under a comparative fault analysis.323
Specifically, courts have rejected reliance upon the "reasonable
range" test, which places primary emphasis on whether the settlement was within the range of the settling party's reasonably projected share of liability for the injured party's damages.324
In another case addressing the element of good faith, the
314. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302 (1989).
315. Brown, 554 N.E.2d at 597. For further discussion of the Brown court's construction of the terms "release" and "settles," see supra part II.C.4. See also Wasmund v.
Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 482 N.E.2d 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1985) (finding a good
faith settlement despite the fact that the injured party's insurance paid the funds necessary to settle and release the third-party defendant).
316. See, e.g., Wasmund, 482 N.E.2d at 351; Louis J. Perona & Claire Perona Murphy, Good Faith Settlement Under the ContributionAct: Do Trial Courts Have Too Much
Discretion?, 20 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 961 (1989).
317. See Pritchard v. SwedishAmerican Hosp., 557 N.E.2d 988, 992 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d
Dist. 1990); McKanna v. Duo-Fast Corp., 515 N.E.2d 157, 163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1987).
318. O'Connor v. Pinto Trucking Serv. Inc., 501 N.E.2d 263, 267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1986).
319. McKanna, 515 N.E.2d at 163.
320. Mallaney v. Dunaway, 533 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1988).
321. Christmas v. Hughes, 543 N.E.2d 274, 276 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989).
322. Wasmund v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 482 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1985).
323. Snoddy v. Teepak, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 682, 685 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990).
324. Id.; Ruffino v. Hinze, 537 N.E.2d 871, 874 (Il. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989); see also
Jachera v. Blake-Lamb Funeral Homes, Inc., 545 N.E.2d 314, 317-18 (I1. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 1989) (finding the disparity between verdict and settlement not substantial enough
to constitute bad faith and that collusion between the parties was not shown).
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supreme court in Hall v. Archer-Daniels-MidlandCo. 325 stated that
an absence of good faith might be shown if the settling party
sought contribution from other tortfeasors based on a settlement
which did not disclose that a portion of the fund was in reality
allocable to punitive damages. a26
B.

Reasonableness of Settlements that Impair Enforcement of an
Employer's Worker's Compensation Lien

In Blagg v. Illinois F W.D. Truck & Equipment Co.,327 the
supreme court held that the good faith settlement requirement of
the Contribution Act,328 and the employer's compensation lien
protection provision of the Worker's Compensation Act,3 29 combined to mandate that a trial court disapprove a settlement structured to avoid the employer's compensation lien.
William Blagg, a volunteer fireman for the Village of Winthrop
Harbor, was injured when he was thrown from the rear jumpseat
of a firetruck that was responding to an emergency call. 330 Blagg
brought an action against the manufacturer of the firetruck and its
distributor.3 1 Blagg's wife also brought an action for loss of consortium. 332 The manufacturers brought a third-party action for
contribution against the Village, which then brought a fourth-party
action for contribution against Blagg.333 The village also filed a
petition asserting a worker's compensation lien pursuant to section
5(b) of the Worker's Compensation Act 334 in the amount of
$282,251 increasing by $426 each week.33 5
Blagg and his wife agreed to settlements with the manufacturers
and their distributor, which allocated $100,000 to the husband for
his injuries and $350,000 to the wife for her consortium claim.336
The trial court held a hearing and determined that the settlements
were made in good faith.337 The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the Contribution Act's policy of encouraging
325.
326.
327.

524 N.E.2d 586, 592 (Ill. 1988).
Id.
572 N.E.2d 920, 927 (I11. 1991).
328. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(c) (1989).
329. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.5 (1989).
330. Blagg, 572 N.E.2d at 922.
331. Id. at 921.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.5(b) (1989).
335. Blagg, 572 N.E.2d at 921.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 922.
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settlements, embodied in a permissive judicial standard for determining whether a settlement is in good faith, does not apply when
a settlement may impair the employer's compensation lien. 33' The
Blagg appellate court held that section 5(b) of the Worker's Compensation Act requires a different judicial test. Specifically, the appellate court reasoned:
To give effect to section 5(b) in cases where a settlement agreement allocates an award between an employee's claim and the
employee's spouse's loss of consortium claim, we hold that a trial
court must

.

.

"closely scrutinize" the settlement to determine

whether it is fair and reasonable to all the parties, including the
employer holding a worker's compensation lien. This does not
mean that a court must insure that the total amount of an employer's lien is paid before it will allow a spouse to recover for
loss of consortium, but the court must not allow parties to clearly
circumvent the lien by apportioning the bulk of the recovery to
the loss of consortium claim. The trial court should consider
whether the parties would have allocated the settlement the same
way had there not been a worker's compensation lien.339
The court applied this test to the facts and found that the agreement did not fairly and reasonably allocate the award between the
husband,
for his injuries, and the wife, for her loss of consortium. 3 ° The appellate court viewed the settlement as "an obvious
attempt to circumvent the employer's lien" and doubted whether
such a settlement would have been reached if not for the worker's
compensation lien.3 4' The appellate court rejected the settling parties' defense-that the settlement was reasonable because the husband's claim was worth considerably less than the wife's since the
husband's claim was subject to reduction for contributory negli3 42
gence while the wife's independent consortium claim was not.
The appellate court held that the wife's consortium claim was derivative and hence subject to reduction on account of the husband's
contributory negligence.34 3 The appellate court reversed the trial
court's decision approving the settlement agreement and remanded
the cause for proceedings consistent with its opinion. 3 "
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
338. Id.
339. Blagg v. Illinois F.W.D. Truck & Equip. Co., 542 N.E.2d 1294, 1299 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2d Dist. 1989), aff'd, 572 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. 1991) (citations omitted).
340. Id. at 1299-1300.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1300-02.
343. Id. at 1302.
344. Id. at 1303.
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the appellate court, in an opinion that generally tracks the reasoning of the appellate court but is less clear on a number of issues. 345
The supreme court's opinion does not set out as clearly the test to
be used to judge the settlement allocation, although it seems to
have adopted the appellate court's test:
It is of utmost importance that the trial court protect an employer's lien. When a settlement agreement allocates an award
between an employee's claim for personal injuries and a spouse's
claim for loss of consortium, the trial court must closely scrutinize the agreement so that an employer's rights are not abused.
In this case, the appellate court found that the settlement
agreements did "not fairly and reasonably allocate the award between [the husband] for his injuries and [the wife] for her loss of
consortium." The court further noted that the settlements represented an obvious attempt to circumvent the Village's worker's
compensation lien, as no part of [the wife's] loss-of-consortium
award can be used to reimburse the lien. a4
Additionally, the supreme court's opinion does not articulate the
statutory basis for the test. At the end of its discussion of the settlement agreement, the court concluded that the settlement allocation "does not appear to be in good faith.

3 47

At an earlier point,

however, the court seemed to have adopted the appellate court's
reasoning that the test derives, at least in part, from section 5(b) of
the Worker's Compensation Act: "In the case at bar the trial court
focused almost exclusively on section 2(c) and its requirement of
good faith. The trial court virtually
ignored section 5(b) of the
3' 48
Worker's Compensation Act.

The supreme court also agreed with the appellate court that the
wife's consortium claim was derivative and hence subject to reduction by the husband's contributory negligence.3 4 9 The supreme

court stated that this supported the need for another good-faithsettlement hearing rather than, as the appellate court found, further demonstration of the unreasonableness of the settlement allocation.350 Given the deference the supreme court showed the
appellate court's opinion and the supreme court's affirmance of the
appellate court's judgment, any ambiguities in the supreme court's
opinion should be resolved by reference to the clearer opinion of
the appellate court.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Blagg
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

v. Illinois F.W.D. Truck & Equip. Co., 572 N.E.2d 920, 931 (Ill. 1991).
924 (quoting Blagg, 542 N.E.2d at 1294).
923.
927.
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Thus, although the supreme court's affirmation of the appellate
court decision muddies the waters a bit, by proceeding as if this
were a test for whether the settlement was in good faith under the
Contribution Act, the supreme court's opinion nevertheless incorporates the appellate court's test and, thus, its statutory basis in the
worker's compensation provision. The Blagg case should not,
therefore, be read as one applying or elaborating good faith settlement requirements under the Contribution Act.
C. Procedure-Hearingon Good Faith Settlement
The trial court may determine whether a settlement was reached
in good faith. 35 1 The Contribution Act does not specify the hearing

process to be used in determining the good faith basis of a settlement, however, "once a preliminary showing of good faith has
been made, the burden shifts to the party challenging the settlement to establish that it was not made in good faith.

' 352

If found

to be presumptively valid, the party challenging the settlement
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the settlement
was the product of collusion, or tortious or other wrongful
conduct.353
As the Contribution Act does not specify any particular hearing
procedure, the trial court has discretion to decide what type of

hearing process is necessary to determine good faith. 3 54 A prelimi-

nary showing of good faith may be established by an examination
of the pleadings to the extent that they recite the disputed facts, the
settlement terms, and the statement of the settling parties that they
have voluntarily chosen to settle their disputed claim.3 5 The court
may permit the challenging party to conduct discovery on the issue
of good faith. However, in the absence of a showing of relevance,
the challenging party is not entitled to conduct discovery on the
basis of the settlement.35 6 And finally, the due process rights of the
party challenging the settlement are not implicated when the parties settle their claim before the challenging party pays more than
351. Melzer v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 549 N.E.2d 817, 820 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1989).
352. Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 524, 529 (Ill.
1989).
353. Snoddy v. Teepak, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 682, 684 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990).
354. Id.; Melzer, 549 N.E.2d at 820; McKanna v. Duo-Fast Corp., 515 N.E.2d 157,
163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987).
355. Pritchard v. SwedishAmerican Hosp., 557 N.E.2d 988, 992 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2d
Dist. 1990); Ruffino v. Hinze, 537 N.E.2d 871, 873 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1989); see
Lorenz v. Air Illinois, Inc., 522 N.E.2d 1352, 1355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1988).
356. Snoddy, 556 N.E.2d at 684; Ruffino, 537 N.E.2d at 873.
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its pro rata share.357
VI.

CONCLUSION

The supreme court's development of Illinois contribution law
necessarily requires further judicial elaboration and clarification.
Laue v. Leifueit transferred limitations questions from the statutory realm to the judicial realm. Kotecki announced a purely judicial compromise of the competing legislative policies behind
employers' immunity under the Worker's Compensation Act and
the Contribution Act's allocation of liability according to proportionate fault. Hopkins v. Powers, People v. Brockman, and Gerill
Corp. v. J.L. Hargrove Builders together suggest that what constitutes "liability in tort" for purposes of the Contribution Act is
based on what the court considers to be the relevant policy considerations, and not on what "liability in tort" traditionally meant.
In each of these major areas of contribution law, the Illinois
Supreme Court cut the law loose from the language of the Contribution Act and developed it on a case-by-case basis in line with the
court's own view of policy. From the court's past performance, it
is difficult to predict how the court will decide the highly technical
sub-issues in each of these areas. The court's unique blend of statutory and judicial law has created a confusing and uncertain amalgam. The legal profession and the public that it serves must simply
stay tuned and await further developments.

357. Snoddy, 556 N.E.2d at 685 (stating that there is no protected property right in a
contribution claim after the injured party and co-defendant settle).

